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This	   paper	   examines	   the	   2007	   banking	   crisis	   from	   an	   interdisciplinary	   and	   in	   particular	   social	   constructivist	  
perspective	   to	   identify	   its	   structural	   and	   systemic	   causes.	   After	   presenting	   and	   explaining	   a	   wide	   meta-­‐
theoretical	   framework	   that	   can	   accommodate	   different	   understandings	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   action,	   it	   argues	  
that	  some	  of	  the	  scale-­‐invariant	  properties	  of	  community	  currency	  systems	  could	  usefully	  be	  applied	  to	  global	  
finance.	   On	   this	   basis	   it	   presents	   a	   concrete	   proposal	   for	   strengthening	   the	   democratic	   dimension	   of	   the	  
banking	  system	  as	  a	  vital	  nexus	  between	  the	  real	  economy,	  government,	  and	  society.	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  
The	  Banking	  Crisis	  Felt	  Around	  the	  World	  
In	   September	   of	   2008,	   the	  United	   States	   saw	  a	   level	   of	   panic	   not	   previously	   seen	   since	   the	   Great	  
Depression.	   During	   this	   time,	   some	   of	   the	   largest	   and	   most	   renowned	   players	   in	   the	   financial	  
services	   industry	   found	   themselves	   bankrupt	   and	   seeking	   mergers.	   Government	   intervention	  
resulted	   in	   a	   bailout	   of	   capital	   to	   firms	   such	   as	   Bank	   of	   America,	   JPMorgan,	   Citigroup,	   Morgan	  
Stanley,	  Goldman	  Sachs,	  and	  more	  [1].	  Some	  large	  key	  players	  like	  AIG,	  Lehman	  Brothers,	  and	  Bear	  
Stearns	   faced	   bankruptcy	   –	   a	   situation	   unimaginable	   even	   a	   week	   earlier	   [2].	   Nobody	   knew	   how	  
severe	  the	  repercussions	  would	  be	  or	  how	  far	  the	  problems	  would	  spread.	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  international	  banking	  system	  is	  much	  like	  a	  spider’s	  web.	  Banks	  across	  the	  world	  
were	  unknowingly	   linked	  together	  by	   the	  same	  thread,	  being	  prey	   to	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  American	  
housing	  market.	  Regardless	  of	  where	  a	  bank	  was	  physically	  situated,	  other	  banks	  did	  not	  know	  who	  
its	   counterparties	   (the	   institutions	  a	  bank	  has	  contracted	  with)	  were	  and	  what	   risks	   they	  also	  had	  
taken.	   As	   liquidity	   froze,	   the	   international	   banking	   system	   collapsed	   and	   a	   severe	   recession	   fell	  
across	   the	   globe.	   This	   paper	   explicitly	   addresses	   the	   American	   crisis	   since	   that	   is	   where	   the	   root	  
causes	   originated;	   however,	   the	   analysis	   and	   its	   implications	   are	   relevant	   to	   the	   global	   banking	  
system,	  irrespective	  of	  nation.	  
	  
The	  Social	  Constructivist	  Perspective	  
The	   banking	   crisis	   offers	   a	   case	   study	   of	   individual	   and	   collective	   socio-­‐economic	   action	   rich	   in	  
opportunities	  for	  analysis.	  This	  paper	  retraces	  the	  chain	  of	  events	  that	  started	  with	  bad	  house	  loans	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and	  ended	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  and	  other	  major	  investment	  banks.	  The	  paper	  then	  
analyzes	  the	  structural	  flaws	  of	  the	  banking	  system	  and	  proposes	  a	  potential	  solution.	  The	  events	  of	  
the	  crisis	  are	  well	  documented	  in	  Brunnermeier	  (2009)	  [3],	  who	  provides	  a	  clear	  explanation	  of	  the	  
mechanism	  and	  dynamics	   that	   led	   to	   an	   $8	   trillion	   loss	   in	   value	  of	   the	   US	   stock	  market	   between	  
October	   2007	   and	   October	   2008.	   Epstein	   (2009)	   [4]	   examines	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   US	   Federal	  
Reserve	   Bank	   and	   criticizes	   the	   principle	   of	   bank	   independence,	   proposing	   a	   policy	   response.	  
Similarly	  to	  Caprio	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  [5],	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  not	  to	  allocate	  blame,	  but	  to	  look	  for	  
structural	   explanations	   for	   the	   crisis.	   Caprio	   et	   al.	   present	   a	   thorough	   analysis	   of	   the	   merits	   or	  
demerits	  of	  Basel	   I	  and	  Basel	   II,	  which	  have	  set	  the	  regulatory	  environment	  for	  banking	  since	  1987,	  
and	  calls	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  egregious	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  plaguing	  credit	  rating	  organizations	  (CROs).	  
	  
By	  contrast,	   this	  paper	  does	  not	  pretend	  to	  perform	  as	   in-­‐depth	  and	  technical	  an	  analysis	  as	  these	  
other	   works.	   Rather,	   we	   are	   interested	   in	   analyzing	   the	   events	   from	   a	  more	   interdisciplinary	   and	  
specifically	   social	   constructivist	   perspective,	   which	   we	   believe	   complements	   nicely	   other	   more	  
specialist	  studies.	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  different	  flavour,	  our	  proposed	  solution	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  articles	  
cited	  above	  in	  calling	  for	  greater	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  all	  the	  stakeholders,	  
but	  especially	  the	  banks.	  A	  social	  constructivist	  perspective	  is	  useful	  because	  
	  
1-­‐	  it	  provides	  a	  conceptual	  vocabulary	  that	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  characterising	  the	  main	  actors	  in	  this	  
event	  because	  it	  can	  describe	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  action,	  
2-­‐	   it	   provides	   a	  way	   to	   rationalize	   the	   emergence	  of	   structural	   causes,	   drivers,	   and	   constraints	  
(e.g.	  Giddens’s	  Structuration),	  and	  
3-­‐	   it	   depicts	   an	   open-­‐ended	   socio-­‐economic	   environment	   that	   is	   able	   to	   renew	   itself	   through	  
social	  processes;	  i.e.	  it	  offers	  a	  modicum	  of	  hope.	  
	  
Before	  we	  enter	  the	  thread	  of	  discussion	  of	  this	  paper,	  which	  touches	  on	  a	  number	  of	  complex	  and	  
long-­‐standing	  issues	  in	  social	  theory,	  it	  seems	  opportune	  to	  clarify	  our	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  social	  
constructivism.	  We	  do	  this	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Boghossian’s	  clear	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  [6]:	  
	  
Whence	  …	   the	  widespread	   impression	   that	   social	   constructionists	  are	  anti-­‐rationalist,	   anti-­‐realist	   and	  
anti-­‐objectivist?	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  it	  stems	  not	  from	  the	  forms	  of	  the	  claims	  themselves,	  and	  not	  from	  
their	  application	  to	  this	  or	  that	  empirically	  debatable	  subject	  matter.	  It	  stems,	  rather,	  from	  the	  desire	  of	  
some	  prominent	   theorists	   in	   this	   tradition	   to	  extend	   social	   construction	   talk	   to	  absolutely	   everything	  
and,	   in	   particular,	   to	   the	   facts	   studied	   by,	   and	   the	   knowledge	   claims	   emanating	   from,	   the	   natural	  
sciences.	  [emphasis	  in	  original]	  
	  
If	  we	  can	   label	   the	   theorists	  Boghossian	   is	   referring	   to	   (e.g.	  Pickering,	   Latour,	  Woolgar)	  as	   ‘radical’	  
social	  constructivists	  (or	  constructionists),	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  much	  more	  ‘moderate’.	  
We	  believe	  social	   constructivism	   is	  very	  useful	   in	   illuminating	  some	   key	  aspects	  of	   socio-­‐economic	  
action,	  and	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  banking	  crisis,	  but	  do	  not	  eschew	  a	  more	  objectivist	  and	  causal	  view	  
of	  the	  events.	  Our	  analysis	  and	  discussion,	   therefore,	  will	  attempt	   to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  
extremes	  of	  radical	  subjectivism,	  relativism,	  and	  social	  constructivism,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  of	  the	  
radical	  objectivism	  of	  physics,	  on	  the	  other.	  
	  
In	  particular,	  a	  social	  constructivist	  perspective	  enables	  us	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  subjective	  perception	  of	  
the	  nature	  of	  money	  in	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  imagination	  is	  at	  once	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  
social	  context	  the	  economic	  transactions	  are	  embedded	  in,	  and	  acquires	  a	  level	  of	  ‘objectivity’	  that	  
makes	   it	   a	   major	   determinant	   of	   human	   behaviour.	   Armed	   with	   this	   understanding,	   we	   turn	   to	  
Community	   Currencies	   as	   a	   positive	   example	   that	   supports	   some	   of	   the	   claims	   we	   make	   in	   the	  
analysis	   of	   the	   banking	   crisis	   and	   that	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   source	  of	   inspiration	   in	   the	  development	   of	  
strategies	   aiming	   to	   offset	   its	   recurrence.	   In	   particular,	   community	   currencies	   provide	   a	   clear	  
example	   of	   bottom-­‐up	   and	   incremental,	   as	   opposed	   to	   top-­‐down	   and	   regulatory,	   intervention	   to	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strengthen	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   through	   greater	   trust	   and	   transparency.	   Clearly,	   the	  
relevance	   of	   our	   argument	   depends	   in	   part	   on	   how	   the	   dynamics	   of	   systems	   at	   such	   extremely	  
different	  scales	  as	  neighbourhood	  economies	  based	  on	  community	  currencies	  and	  global	  finance	  can	  
be	  related.	  Furthermore,	  community	  currencies	  by	  themselves	  can	  only	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  
under	  discussion,	  so	  that	  we	  will	  need	  to	  cast	  the	  net	  wider	  to	  piece	  together	  a	  plausible	  story.	  
THE	  EVENTS	  AND	  CAUSES	  LEADING	  TO	  THE	  2007	  BANKING	  CRISIS	  
	  
A	  Brief	  Overview	  
A	  banking	  panic	  began	  on	  August	  9th,	  2007.	  Unlike	  traditional	  banking	  panics,	  this	  one	  was	  invisible	  
to	  the	  public.	  No	  individuals	  were	  running	  to	  the	  banks	  seeking	  to	  withdraw	  their	  money	  but,	  rather,	  
institutions	  were	  panicking	   and	  demanding	   the	   settlement	   of	   huge	   sums	  of	  money	   [7].	   The	   result	  
was	  a	   severe	   run	  on	   the	  banks	   that	   rippled	   through	   the	   financial	   system	  over	   the	  next	   year	  and	  a	  
half,	   leaving	  even	  some	  of	  the	  oldest	  and	  most	  reputable	  firms	  bankrupt.	  September	  2008	  marked	  
the	   climax	   of	   the	   crisis	   with	   bankruptcies	   of	   major	   firms	   such	   as	   Lehman	   Brothers,	   Washington	  
Mutual,	  and	  AIG	  [8].	  Three	  years	  later,	  the	  repercussions	  are	  still	  being	  felt,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  frequency	  of	  bank	  failures	  remains	  high	  [9].	  This	  paper	  will	  examine	  what	  happened	  and	  will	  
develop	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  crisis	  occurred.	  Before	  explaining	  what	  appears	  to	  have	  triggered	  
the	  panic,	  the	  event	  itself	  needs	  an	  appropriate	  foundation.	  
	  
Increased	  Popularity	  of	  ‘Securitization’	  
In	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   flurry	   of	  media	   attention	   surrounding	   the	   credit	   crisis,	   the	  housing	  market	   is	  
often	   discussed	   and	   blamed	   for	   causing	   the	   recession.	   However,	   most	   of	   the	   media	   and	   general	  
public	   are	   unaware	   of	   the	   role	   the	   housing	   market	   played	   in	   the	   crisis.	   Similarly,	   terms	   such	   as	  
‘securitization’	   and	   ‘mortgage-­‐backed	   securities’	   are	   thrown	   around	   without	   carefully	   defining	   or	  
explaining	   them.	   Thus,	   this	   task	   serves	   as	   an	   appropriate	   place	   to	   begin	   since	   the	  meanings	   that	  
have	  come	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  these	  terms	  mark	  the	  origination	  of	  the	  banking	  crisis.	  
	  
Securitization,	   as	   defined	   by	   Investopedia,	   is	   “the	   process	   of	   taking	   an	   illiquid	   asset,	   or	  group	   of	  
assets,	  and	  through	  financial	  engineering,	  transforming	  them	  into	  a	  security”	  [10].	  Organizations	  like	  
Freddie	   and	   Fannie	  Mac	   securitized	  mortgages	   (which	   are	   essentially	   bonds	   due	   to	   their	   identical	  
payment	  structures)	  and	  the	  result	  was	  Mortgage	  Backed	  Securities	  (MBS)	  [11].	  Adding	  an	  additional	  
layer	   of	   complication,	   a	   type	   of	   MBS	   is	   a	   Collateralized	  Mortgage	   Obligation	   (CMO),	   which	   pools	  
various	   mortgage	   securities	   into	   tranches	   [12].	   Essentially,	   securitization	   transformed	   house	  
mortgages	   into	   financial	   instruments	   which	   could	   be	   traded,	   bet	   upon,	   or	   used	   as	   collateral.	  
Securitization	  allows	  for	  cheaper	  costs	  to	  home-­‐buyers	  and	  increases	  the	  liquidity	  of	  mortgages	  for	  
banks.	  By	  itself,	  securitization	  is	  not	  a	  harmful	  development.	  
	  
Makings	  of	  the	  Housing	  Bubble	  
While	  this	   increase	  of	  securitization	  was	  occurring	   in	   the	  US,	  simultaneously	  a	  housing	  bubble	  was	  
forming.	   The	   bubble	   formed	   due	   to	   low	   interest	   rates	   set	   by	   the	   Federal	   Reserve,	   lax	   lending	  
standards,	  government	  subsidization,	  and	  guarantees	   in	  the	  secondary	  housing	  market	   	  [13].	  Since	  
there	  were	  so	  many	  incentives	  to	  buy	  homes,	  demand	  increased	  and	  prices	  went	  up;	  yet	  consumer	  
income	  did	  not	  increase	  proportionally.	  Put	  simply,	  people	  were	  buying	  homes	  with	  mortgages	  that	  
they	   couldn’t	   afford.	   The	   ease	   with	   which	   credit	   was	   assigned	   came	   to	   be	   legitimised	   by	   the	  
continued	  and	  steady	  rise	  in	  property	  prices,	  since	  with	  increasing	  appreciation	  the	  level	  of	  leverage	  
(ratio	  of	  loan	  to	  house	  value)	  would	  automatically	  shrink	  over	  time	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  rate	  than	  it	  was	  
being	  repaid.	  This	  effect,	  however,	  was	  mainly	  dependent	  on	  market	  perception.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  
market	  perception	  of	  value	  can	  diverge	  very	  quickly	  from	  averages	  taken	  over	  a	  range	  of	  different	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possible	   historical	   periods	   signals	   that	   the	   market	   as	   a	   price-­‐determining	   mechanism	   may	   be	  
breaking	   down,	   which	   is	   precisely	   what	   creates	   a	   ‘bubble’.	   A	   graph	   of	   household	   debt	   service	  
payments,	   which	   are	   primarily	  made	  up	  of	   outstanding	  mortgage	  debt	   as	   a	   percent	   of	   disposable	  
income,	  shows	  a	  steady	  climb	  from	  2000	  through	  2007	  and	  then	  the	  subsequent	  correction	  once	  the	  
housing	  bubble	   burst	   (Figure	   1).	   Figure	   2	   further	   reflects	   how	  banks	  were	   lending	   to	   people	  who	  
shouldn’t	  have	  necessarily	  received	  loans	  by	  displaying	  the	  delinquency	  rate’s	  vast	  increase	  in	  2007	  
through	  2009.	  	  
	  
In	   summary,	   the	   last	   decade	   saw	   an	   increased	   amount	   of	   securitization,	   which	   turned	  mortgages	  
into	  financial	   instruments	  that	  could	  be	  used	  for	  various	  purposes.	  Coinciding	  with	  this	  movement,	  
the	   American	   government	   and	   banking	   system	   incentivized	   the	   purchase	   of	   homes	   through	   easy	  
credit.	  Now,	  the	  final	  catalyst	  and	  most	  esoteric	  cause	  of	  the	  crisis	  must	  be	  brought	  in	  –	  the	  ‘shadow	  
banking	  system’.	  The	  following	  explanation	  is	  graphically	  depicted	  in	  Figures	  3-­‐5.	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  ‘Shadow	  Banking	  System’?	  
Institutional	   investors	   often	   have	   large	   amounts	   of	   money	   being	   held	   for	   short	   periods	   of	   time.	  	  
While	   individuals	   may	   choose	   to	   put	   their	   money	   into	   a	   savings	   account	   rather	   than	   under	   their	  
mattress,	  institutions	  have	  more	  profitable	  options	  open	  to	  them	  due	  to	  the	  magnitude	  of	  their	  idle	  
money.	  However,	  these	  institutions	  have	  a	  few	  criteria	  for	  their	  investment:	  the	  instrument	  must	  be	  
relatively	  safe,	  liquid,	  and	  it	  must	  yield	  a	  higher	  return	  than	  more	  conventional	  instruments	  such	  as	  
savings	   accounts.	   The	   popular	   choice	   became	   the	   ‘repo	   market’	   (which	   stands	   for	   ‘sale	   and	  
repurchase	  market’;	  Step	  5	   in	  Figure	  3),	  which	  is	  an	  overnight	  market	  allowing	  large	  institutions	  to	  
loan	  out	  their	  idle	  cash	  in	  exchange	  for	  collateral,	  while	  making	  a	  satisfactory	  amount	  of	  interest	  on	  
the	   loaned	   funds.	   The	   repo	   market,	   estimated	   at	   a	   size	   of	   over	   $12	   trillion	   prior	   to	   the	   crisis,	  
provided	  the	  return	  and	  liquidity	  institutions	  were	  seeking.	  Since	  banks	  like	  Bear	  Stearns	  would	  earn	  
a	  higher	  rate	  of	  interest	  from	  the	  money	  lent	  to	  them	  (Step	  10),	  they	  would	  offer	  bonds	  as	  collateral	  
(Step	  7).	  The	  exchange	  of	  collateral	  for	  the	  loan	  is	  what	  is	  termed	  the	  shadow	  banking	  system.	  The	  
loan	  from	  the	  traditional	  banking	  system	  (Step	  3)	  is	  what	  links	  the	  traditional	  banking	  system	  to	  the	  




Figure	  1:	  The	  housing	  bubble	  evidenced	  through	  household	  debt	  service	  payments	  
	   5	  
Linking	  Together	  Securitization,	  the	  Housing	  Bubble,	  and	  the	  Shadow	  Banking	  System	  
In	  many	  cases,	  the	  bonds	  exchanged	  as	  collateral	  were	  composed	  of	  securities	  from	  the	  repo	  market	  
such	   as	   MBSs	   and	   CMOs,	   which	   securitization	   made	   possible.	   So	   now	   banks	   and	   the	   investing	  
institutions	  were	  holding	  large	  amounts	  of	  bonds	  as	  collateral,	  backed	  by	  the	  housing	  market,	  which	  
was	   currently	   overinvested	   in.	   Such	   interconnectedness	   throughout	   the	   system	   is	   not	   to	   be	  
preferred,	  but	  this	  still	  leaves	  us	  unsure	  about	  what	  truly	  triggered	  the	  banking	  crisis.	  
	  
Most	   banks	   in	   the	   world,	   including	   those	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   operate	   using	   a	   fractional-­‐reserve	  
banking	   system.	  A	   fractional-­‐reserve	  banking	   system	   is	   a	   system	   “in	  which	  only	  a	   fraction	  of	   bank	  
deposits	   are	   [sic]	   backed	  by	   actual	   cash-­‐on-­‐hand	   and	   are	   available	   for	  withdrawal.	  This	   is	   done	   to	  
expand	   the	   economy	   by	   freeing	   up	   capital	   that	   can	   be	   loaned	   out	   to	   other	   parties”	   [14].	   Such	   a	  
system	   collapses	   if	   many	   people	   try	   to	   withdraw	   their	   deposits	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   since	   only	   a	  
fraction	  of	  the	  deposits	  is	  available	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  In	  order	  for	  this	  system	  to	  operate,	  banks	  rely	  





Figure	  2:	  Unsound	  lending	  practices	  for	  U.S.	  residential	  mortgages	  [15]	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Figure	  4:	  Mortgage	  defaults	  increase,	  leading	  to	  greater	  perceived	  risk	  in	  the	  repo	  market	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Because	   the	   banks	   utilized	   a	   fractional-­‐reserve	   banking	   system,	   the	   actions	   banks	   were	   taking	  
became	   increasingly	   risky	   due	   to	   the	   shadow	  banking	   system.	  As	   investment	   banks	   grew	  greedier	  
and	  more	  willing	  to	  take	  on	  risk,	  institutions	  demanded	  more	  collateral	  than	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  
being	   lent	   to	   the	  bank	   (this	  difference	   is	   termed	  a	   ‘haircut’;	  Step	  8).	  Haircuts	   expanded	  over	   time	  
and	  in	  turn	  banks	   like	  Bear	  Sterns	  needed	  larger	  amounts	  of	  money	  to	  balance	  the	  net	  withdrawal	  
(the	   net	   negative	   balance	   due	   to	   the	   haircut).	   Because	   of	   the	   fractional	   reserve	   banking	   system,	  
usually	   this	  net	  withdrawal	   is	   funded	  by	  more	   loans	   from	  other	   institutions	  or	   investors	   (Step	  11);	  
hence	  the	  importance	  of	  keeping	  the	  money	  flowing	  when	  practically	  all	  the	  banks	  rely	  on	  fractional	  
reserves.	  
	  
Meanwhile,	   American	   homeowners	   started	   to	   default	   on	   their	   mortgages	   (Step	   13).	   Due	   to	  
securitization,	   the	   institutions	   had	   no	   idea	   how	   and	   where	   their	   risk	   was	   distributed.	   Institutions	  
holding	  MBSs	  and	  CMOs	  as	  collateral	  only	  knew	  that	  they	  were	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  housing	  market.	  
Once	   institutions	   became	   aware	   of	   how	   little	   they	   knew	   about	   their	   exposure,	   they	   started	   to	  
demand	   their	   loans	   back	   from	   the	   banks.	   Now,	   all	   of	   a	   sudden,	   banks	   were	   faced	   with	   a	   net	  
withdrawal	  estimated	  at	  an	  aggregate	  of	  $2	   trillion	  due	  to	  haircuts	  (Step	  15),	  on	  top	  of	  the	  money	  
needed	  for	  the	  institutions	  who	  were	  demanding	  their	   loans	  back.	  Normally	  banks	  would	  raise	  this	  
money	  by	  more	  loans	  from	  other	  institutions,	  but	  at	  this	  point	   institutions	  looked	  in	  the	  mirror	  and	  
saw	   the	   riskiness	   of	   their	   previous	   loans	   (Step	   14).	   Institutions	   were	   now	   too	   afraid	   to	   loan	  
additional	  money,	  but	  unfortunately	   it	  was	  already	   too	   late.	   Banks	  became	  desperate	   to	  meet	   the	  
monetary	  demands	  –	  they	  indiscriminately	  sold	  all	  of	  their	  bonds	  and	  panicked	  (Steps	  17	  &	  19).	  
	  
Panic	  Breeds	  Panic	  
The	  cause	  of	  the	  indiscriminate	  selling	  was	  that	  banks	  had	  no	  idea	  where	  the	  risk	  lay,	  how	  large	  the	  
risk	  was,	  and	  who	  was	  taking	   the	  risks.	   ‘Opaque’	  best	  describes	  the	  web	  of	   the	  repo	  market.	  Once	  
weakness	  was	  revealed	  in	  the	  market,	  everyone	  immediately	  became	  suspicious	  of	  each	  other	  since	  
no	  bank	   knew	  where	  anyone	  else	  stood.	   Evidence	  of	   this	   is	   found	   in	   the	   LIBOR-­‐OIS	   [16]	   spread,	  a	  
metric	  used	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  to	  measure	  the	  perception	  of	  risk	  in	  the	  credit	  markets.	  Spreads	  
blew	  out	  in	  August	  2007	  and	  quickly	  reached	  record	  levels	  as	  more	  and	  more	  firms	  were	  found	  to	  be	  
over-­‐leveraged	  in	  the	  repo	  markets	  (Figure	  6).	  
	  
A	  Lack	  of	  Trust	  and	  Transparency	  as	  the	  Root	  Causes	  
As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3,	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  the	  crisis	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  originate	  from	  the	  willingness	  of	  
local	  banks	  to	  accept	  unreasonable	  levels	  of	  risk	  in	  funding	  mortgages	  to	  borrowers	  of	  weak	  credit-­‐
worthiness.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  securitization	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  package	  the	  bonds	  as	  MBS	  
and	  pass	  on	   the	   risk	   to	   investment	  banks.	  So	   is	   securitization	   the	  culprit?	  As	  we	  stated	  above,	  not	  
when	   it	   is	  handled	   responsibly.	  The	   individuals	   running	   the	   investment	  banks,	   in	   turn,	  were	  –	  and	  
still	  are	   –	   incentivized	   to	   take	  on	  huge	   levels	  of	   risk	   since,	   if	   things	  go	  wrong,	   they	  are	  covered	  by	  
‘golden	  parachutes’	  built	   into	  their	  employment	  contracts.	  So	  perhaps	  the	  system	  of	  bonuses	  is	  the	  
culprit,	  as	  has	  been	  argued	  repeatedly	  in	  the	  press	  since	  the	  crisis?	  These	  are	  all	  contributing	  factors,	  
of	  course.	  
	  
From	  a	  global	   system	  perspective,	  however,	  we	  could	  also	  say	   that	   the	  accretion	  of	  value	   through	  
interest	  reinforced	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  risk,	  since	  everyone	  was	  motivated	  to	  participate.	  
Because	   of	   this	   shared	   culture	   of	   risk,	   the	   development	   of	   ever-­‐more	   ambitious	   derivatives	   and	  
leveraging	  instruments	  acquired	  the	  character	  of	  a	  game	  decoupled	  from	  a	  transparent	  assessment	  
of	  the	  different	  perceptions	  of	  the	  underlying	  risk	  [17].	  To	  clarify,	  while	  there	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  sole	  
objective	   [18]	   measure	   of	   risk,	   increased	   transparency	   allows	   for	   an	   easier	   and	   more	   accurate	  
assessment.	   Disagreements	   may	   still	   occur	   over	   how	   much	   risk	   exists,	   but	   greater	   transparency	  
would	  enable	  different	   stakeholders	   to	  make	  more	   informed	  decisions.	  We	  argue	   that,	  more	   than	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the	   other	   possible	   contributing	   factors	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   lack	   of	   the	   ability	   to	   make	   a	  










Figure	  6:	  3-­‐Month	  LIBOR-­‐OIS	  Spread	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Serving	   as	   inspiration	   for	   this	   paper,	   Figure	   6	   provides	   an	   indirect	   measure	   of	   the	   lack	   of	  
transparency	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  banking	  system.	  The	  banking	  system	  experienced	  a	  lack	  of	  capital	  and	  
banks	  did	  not	  know	  how	  much	  capital	  was	  needed,	  who	  needed	  the	  capital,	  and	  who	  didn’t	  have	  it.	  
As	  Wood	  explains:	  
	  
This	  could	  come	  about	  for	  example	  if	  one	  large	  loan	  suddenly	  collapsed	  in	  value,	  or	  if	  a	  whole	  group	  of	  
loans	   collapsed.	   As	   bank	   balance	   sheets	   are	   opaque	   to	   customers	   (and	   apparently	   often	   to	  
management	   too	   if	   recent	   experience	   is	   anything	   to	   go	   by)	   this	   leads	   to	   fears	   about	   the	   solvency	   of	  
other	  banks,	  runs	  take	  place	  on	  them,	  and	  again	  in	  the	  extreme	  the	  whole	  system	  fails	  [19].	  
	  
While	  many	  academics	  and	  financial	  gurus	  may	  have	  foreseen	  the	  potential	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  
collapse	  of	  the	  subprime	  market	  and	  alleged	  that	  banks	  should	  have	  foreseen	  such	  dangers,	   it	  was	  
not	   this	   crash	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	  banks.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  clarify	   that	   the	  housing	  
bubble	  and	  subprime	  mortgages	  did	  not	  cause	  the	  crisis,	  but	  that	  they	  were	  key	  factors	  in	  the	  crisis	  
because	  they	  triggered	  a	  panic	  in	  the	  repo	  market.	  This	  panic	   is	  what	  led	  to	  the	  bank	  failures	  since	  
the	  housing	  market	  by	  itself	  was	  too	  small	  to	  have	  such	  an	  impact.	  So	  while	  banks	  may	  have	  known	  
who	  they	  were	  transacting	  with	  and	  how	  interconnected	  their	  fates	  were,	  it	  was	  the	  bursting	  of	  the	  
housing	   bubble	   that	   scared	   banks	   into	   the	   realization	   that	   the	   vastness	   of	   the	   repo	  market	   was	  
unknown	  [20].	  Facing	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  how	  large	  the	  repo	  market	  was	  and	  how	  vulnerable	  it	  was	  
to	  the	  housing	  crash,	  banks	  panicked.	  Thus,	  it	  was	  the	  panic	  caused	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  
repo	  market	  which	  led	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  banks.	  Even	  in	  hindsight	  only	  a	  broad	  estimate	  can	  be	  given	  
about	  the	  size	  of	  the	  repo	  market	  [3]	  The	  repo	  market	  was	  in	  fact	  huge	  –	  $20	  trillion	  –	  yet	  even	  now	  
that	   is	  still	  an	  estimate,	  so	   it	  would	  have	  been	  difficult	  for	  banks	  to	  foresee	   the	  effect	  on	   the	  repo	  
market	  without	  knowing	  its	  size.	  
	  
On	  this	  basis	  we	  suggest	  that	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  money	  and	   its	  derived	   investment	   instruments	  as	  
interest-­‐earning	  media	   of	   economic	   exchange	   create	   the	  potential	   for	   a	   structural	   problem	   in	   the	  
system.	  We	  also	  suggest	   that	  a	   lack	  of	  trust	  and	  transparency	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  factors	  
which	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   crisis.	   One	  means	   of	   examining	   the	   importance	  of	   high	   levels	   of	   trust	   and	  
transparency	  is	  to	  consider	  these	  aspects	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  a	  social	  constructivist	  perspective,	  and	  
to	  examine	  them	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  development	  of	  community	  currencies,	  the	  adoption	  of	  which	  
has	  increased	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  banking	  crisis.	  	  
A	  CONCRETE	  LOOK	  AT	  COMMUNITY	  CURRENCIES	  
	  
The	  Development	  of	  Community	  Currencies	  as	  a	  Response	  to	  Financial	  Crises	  
Community	  currencies	  are	  a	  form	  of	  local	  currency	  which	  serves	  to	  supplement	  a	  national	  currency	  
in	  order	  to	  stimulate	  a	  local	  economy.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  severe	  recession	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  
emergence	  of	  community	  currencies	  has	   increased	  across	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  [21].	  This	   is	  
important	   since	   the	   choice	   of	   local	   markets	   to	   utilize	   community	   currencies	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   the	  
downfall	   of	   the	  overarching	  banking	   system	  highlights	   the	   ability	   of	   socially	   constructed	   concepts	  
and	  practices	  to	  provide	  solutions	  to	  economic	  problems.	  Particularly	  in	  tough	  economic	  times,	  local	  
markets	  develop	  community	  currencies	  to	  stimulate	  the	  regional	  economy.	  To	  provide	  a	  context	  for	  
this	   discussion,	   some	   successful	   implementations	   of	   community	   currencies	   are	   introduced	  
chronologically	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
The	   first	   successful	   example	   of	   community	   currencies,	   the	   Swiss	   WIR,	   shows	   how	   community	  
currencies	  can	  work	  on	  a	  much	   larger	   scale.	   	  Paul	  Enz	  and	  Werner	  Zimmermann	   founded	   the	  WIR	  
business	  circle	  cooperative	  in	  1934,	  also	  to	  help	  fight	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  economic	  slowdown	  –	  in	  this	  
case	  the	  Great	  Depression	  [22].	  One	  WIR	  Franc	   is	  equal	  to	  one	  Swiss	  Franc	  and	  thousands	  of	  Swiss	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businesses	   allow	   purchases	   to	   be	   made	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   WIR	   and	   Francs.	   The	   WIR	   Bank	  
Cooperative	  handles	   the	   transactions	  of	  over	  62,000	  businesses,	  which	  means	  about	  20%	  of	  Swiss	  
business	   are	   members.	   These	   statistics	   make	   the	   Swiss	  WIR	   the	   largest	   and	   oldest	   example	   of	   a	  
community	  currency.	  Most	  of	  the	  members	  are	  SMEs:	  
	  
WIR	   is	   a	   cooperative	  association	  of	   small	   to	  medium	  size,	   independent	   (grass	   roots)	   Swiss	  businesses	  
for	   the	   purpose	   of	  mobilizing	   their	   own	   credit	   potentialities,	   i.e.,	  without	   using	   commercial	   banks	   as	  
intermediaries,	   to	  facilitate	  business	  transactions	  within	  their	  own	  circle.	   	  This	  arrangement	  prevents,	  
or	  at	  least	  inhibits,	  the	  outflow	  of	  capital	  and	  profits	  to	  the	  large	  chain	  stores,	  department	  stores,	  stock	  
corporations,	  etc.	   	  WIR	  credit	   can	  be	  described	  as	  supplementary,	   low-­‐cost	   credit,	  but	  has	  had	  also	  –	  
the	  fully	  intended	  –	  result	  of	  increasing	  the	  business	  volume	  of	  their	  members.	  	  As	  a	  self-­‐help	  measure,	  
it	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  successful	   in	  large	  measure	  in	  protecting	  the	  small,	  independent	  businessman	  
against	  the	  constantly	  increasing	  pressure	  from	  large,	  financially	  strong	  competitors	  [22].	  
	  
Research	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Swiss	  WIR	  on	  the	  Swiss	  economy	  and	  the	  studies	  
showed	   that	   the	   community	   currency	   has	   helped	   to	   combat	   economic	   slowdowns.	   To	   summarize	  
the	  findings:	  
	   	  
…the	   WIR	   system	   has	   given	   proof	   of	   its	   profoundly	   anti-­‐cyclical	   character.	  	   In	   periods	   of	   economic	  
boom,	   it	  has	  tended	  to	  grow	  more	  slowly	  than	  the	  economic	  average,	  while	   in	  periods	  of	  recession	   it	  
has	  tended	  to	  grow	  more	  quickly	  than	  average.	  Thus	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Swiss	  economy	  
[23].	  
	  
In	  times	  of	  high	  unemployment,	  utilization	  of	  the	  WIR	  has	   increased	  to	  promote	  the	  stimulation	  of	  
the	  local	  economy.	  
	  
Another	  notable	  alternative	  to	  a	  national	  currency	  is	  LETS,	  most	  commonly	  accepted	  as	  an	  acronym	  
for	  Local	  Exchange	  Trading	  System	  [24].	  Originally	  named	  LETS	  due	  to	  the	  cooperative	  and	  inviting	  
implications	   of	   the	   word,	   Michael	   Linton	   designed	   the	   system	   in	   1983	   to	   be	   used	   in	   the	   Comox	  
Valley	  of	  British	  Columbia	  [25].	  His	  reasoning	  for	  doing	  so	  was	  that	  he	  found	  that	  unemployment	  and	  
economic	  slowdowns	  were	  related	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  money	  for	  barter.	   In	  order	  to	  
truly	  be	  a	  LETS	  system,	  there	  are	  five	  common	  rules	  that	  must	  be	  followed	  [26]:	  
	  
1-­‐	   Cost	  of	  service	  –	  since	  administration	  and	  operation	  positions	  are	  needed	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  system	  is	  
functioning	  properly,	  certain	  personnel	  need	  to	  be	  paid	  in	  local	  currency	  for	  maintaining	  the	  system.	  
2-­‐	   Consent	  –	  all	  members	  must	  agree	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  system,	  adhere	  to	  the	  balances	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  
transact	  in	  good	  faith.	  
3-­‐	   Disclosure	   –	   Trust	   is	   of	   paramount	   importance	   to	   the	   system,	   along	   with	   transparency,	   in	   order	   to	  
prevent	  abuses	  of	  the	  system.	  
4-­‐	   Equivalence-­‐	   LETS	  must	  be	  able	  to	  be	  converted	  at	  a	  certain	  rate	   into	  national	  currency	  to	  encourage	  
the	  participation	  of	  businesses	  and	  new	  members.	  
5-­‐	   No	  interest	  –	  the	  point	  of	  the	  system	  is	  to	  stimulate	  the	  economy,	  not	  to	  have	  LETS	  hoarded	  for	  future	  
use.	  
	  
When	  these	  rules	  are	  adhered	  to,	  the	  system	  can	  be	  extremely	  effective.	  Hundreds	  of	  communities	  
around	  the	  globe	  now	  utilize	  LETS.	  
	  
Another	   successful	   example	   is	   that	   of	   the	   Ithaca	   Hours	   paper	   currency.	   Paul	   Glover	   introduced	  
Ithaca	  Hours	  within	  the	  local	  community	  of	  Ithaca,	  New	  York	  during	  the	  1991	  recession	  [27].	  Despite	  
some	   tweaks	   over	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	   the	   system	   of	   a	   local	   community	   currency	   is	   still	   going	  
strong.	   Hundreds	   of	   vendors	   across	   all	   industries	   accept	   Ithaca	   Hours	   and	   thousands	   of	   kids,	  
students,	   and	   adults	   earn	   them	   [28].	   The	   success	   of	   the	   local	   currency	   has	   earned	   it	   significant	  
amounts	  of	  publicity	  and	  the	  model	  has	  now	  been	  copied	  across	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  beyond.	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Many	   may	   ask,	   “Why	   go	   through	   all	   the	   trouble	   of	   printing	   Ithaca	   Hours?”	   One	   of	   the	   most	  
important	  benefits	  of	  a	   local	   currency	   is	  that	  the	  money	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  real	   labour	  hours.	   In	  this	  
case,	  an	  hour	  of	  work	  earns	  one	  Ithaca	  Hour,	  which	   is	  worth	  $10	  [29].	  This	   increases	  support	  for	  a	  
higher	  minimum	  wage,	  while	  also	  fighting	  inflationary	  or	  deflationary	  movements	  since	  the	  value	  of	  
money	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   physical	   constraints	   of	   a	   labour	   force.	   Other	   benefits	   are	   that	   this	   money	  
must	  be	  spent	  locally,	  which	  stimulates	  the	  local	  economy	  and	  keeps	  the	  Ithaca	  Hours	  in	  circulation	  
at	  a	  high	  velocity.	  Additionally,	  some	  Ithaca	  Hours	  are	  given	  as	  grants	  to	  those	  who	  need	  them,	  and	  
also	  one	  can	  borrow	  Hours	  without	  paying	   interest,	  which	  would	  otherwise	  also	  drain	   the	   flow	  of	  
money.	   For	   these	   reasons,	   the	   town	   of	   Ithaca	   has	   continued	   to	   support	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
community	  currency.	  
	  
A	  further	  example	  of	  community	  currencies	  is	  the	  Second	  Life	  Linden	  Dollar,	  which	  takes	  the	  concept	  
of	  community	  currency	  into	  a	  new	  realm	  –	  that	  of	  the	  Internet.	  	  Second	  Life	  is	  a	  3D	  virtual	  world	  that	  
seeks	   to	   mimic	   real	   life	   through	   the	   Internet	   [30].	   Users,	   known	   as	   residents	   in	   the	   Second	   Life	  
world,	   control	   an	   avatar	   and	   perform	   activities	   just	   as	   they	   would	   in	   reality.	   For	   business	  
transactions	  within	  this	  world,	  the	  Linden	  Dollar	  exists.	  Although	  a	  virtual	  currency,	  the	  Linden	  dollar	  
can	  be	  exchanged	   into	  any	  currency	  and	  can	  be	  purchased	  with	   real	  money.	  Market	  data	  actually	  
exists	  that	  tracks	  the	  exchange	  of	  Linden	  Dollars	  [31].	  Even	  more	  amazing	  is	  that	  the	  virtual	  economy	  
in	  2009	  had	  a	  value	  of	  $567	  million	   (United	  States	  Dollars)	   [32].	  The	  Linden	  Dollar’s	  existence	   in	  a	  
virtual	  world	  highlights	   the	  versatility	  of	   community	  currencies	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  ever-­‐
changing	  needs	  of	  society.	  
	  
We	   argue	   that	   community	   currencies	   exemplify	   principles	   and	   characteristics	   that	   could	   help	   to	  
mitigate	   the	   root	   causes	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   but	   we	   need	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   that	   can	  
accommodate	  these	  differing	  scales	  of	  economic	  activity.	  
	  
Free	  money	  
Community	  currencies	  in	  their	  modern	  incarnation	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Silvio	  Gesell.	  In	  1906	  Silvio	  
Gesell,	  a	  German/Belgian/Argentinean	  economist,	  published	  The	  Natural	  Economic	  Order	  [33]	  on	  a	  
proposal	  to	  make	  money	  as	  perishable	  as	  the	  goods	  it	  buys,	  i.e.	  a	  currency	  earning	  negative	  interest.	  
Inflation	  has	  a	  similar	  effect,	  but	  inflation	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  an	  explicit	  design	  of	  financial	  policy,	  it	  is	  
not	   planned.	   In	   fact,	   normally	   it	   occurs	   in	   spite	   of	   financial	   policy.	   According	   to	   Gesell,	   negative	  
interest	   would	   motivate	   people	   to	   spend	   their	   money	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible,	   before	   it	   became	  
worthless,	   rather	   than	   to	   hoard	   it.	   The	   resulting	   dynamism	   in	   the	   speed	   at	   which	   money	   would	  
circulate	   in	   the	   economy	   would	   energise	   the	   economy	   and	   support	   growth.	   The	   theory	   of	   free	  
money,	   upon	  which	   community	   currencies	   are	   largely	   based,	   is	   a	   special	   and	   less	   radical	   case	   of	  
‘perishable	  money’	   and	   concerns	  money	   earning	   zero	   interest.	   As	   neatly	   summarised	  on	   the	   LETS	  
system	  website,	  
	  
Money	   is	   just	   information,	  a	  way	  we	  measure	  what	  we	   trade,	  nothing	  of	   value	   in	   itself.	  And	  we	   can	  
make	  it	  ourselves,	  to	  work	  as	  a	  complement	  to	  conventional	  money.	  Just	  a	  matter	  of	  design	  [34].	  
	  
In	   1952	   the	  WIR	  bank	  decided	   to	   abandon	   the	   free	  money	  principle,	   and	  deposits	   began	   to	   earn	  
interest.	  However,	  the	  bank	  remained	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  whose	  sole	  purpose	  was,	  and	  still	  is,	  
to	   support	   the	  members	  of	   the	  WIR	  community	   through	  access	   to	   low-­‐cost	  and	   low-­‐risk	   credit.	   In	  
addition,	  the	  WIR	  currency	   is	  not	  actually	  printed	  in	  physical	  form;	   it	   is	  used	  and	  traded	  only	  as	  an	  
electronic	   currency.	   Since	   2004	   it	   was	   assigned	   its	   own	   symbol	   “CHW”	   by	   the	   British	   Standards	  
Institution	  and	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  [35].	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Thus,	   different	   implementations	   of	   ‘parallel’	   currencies	   can	   follow	  widely	   different	   structures	   and	  
rules.	  What	   is	  common	  to	  all	  of	  them	   is	  the	  substitution	  of	  an	   individualistic	  profit	  motive	  with	  an	  
agreement	  to	  support	  and	  build	  up	  shared	  economic	  activity	  in	  a	  real	  or	  virtual	  community.	  In	  other	  
words,	   community	   currencies	   embody	   a	   conscious	   and	   concerted	   effort	   to	   (1)	   protect	   small-­‐scale	  
economies	   from	   the	   swings	   in	   volume	   and	   value	   of	   large-­‐scale	   economies	   and	   (2)	   rely	   on	   social	  
dynamics	  to	  support	  economic	  dynamics.	  
	  
Drawing	  on	  Gudeman’s	  work	  on	  economic	  anthropology	  [36],	  another	  characterization	   that	  seems	  
appropriate	   relies	   on	   Aristotle’s	   concept	   of	   “use	   value”	   vs.	   “exchange	   value”,	   also	   recognised	   by	  
Adam	  Smith:	  “Some	  things,	  like	  water,	  have	  high	  use	  value	  but	   low	  exchange	  value,	  whereas	  other	  
things,	   such	   as	   diamonds,	   have	   low	   use	   value	   but	   high	   exchange	   value”.	   In	   other	   words,	   if	   the	  
familiar	   distinction	   between	   goods	   and	   commodities	   is	   applied	   to	   money,	   clearly	   community	  
currencies	  only	  have	  use	  value,	  whereas	   interest-­‐bearing	   tender	   leads	  to	  a	  commodification	  of	  the	  
original	   function	  of	  money,	   in	  other	  words	   it	  has	  exchange	   value	  and	   is	   in	   fact	   traded	   in	  currency	  
markets.	  To	  iterate	  the	  concept	  further,	  whereas	  the	  “use	  value”	  of	  interest	  for	  the	  real	  economy	  is	  
hard	  to	  argue	  with,	  as	  we	  move	  to	  securities	  and	  their	  ever-­‐higher	  derivatives,	  the	  use	  value	  of	  these	  
financial	   instruments	   seems	   to	   recede	   to	   the	   background,	   leaving	   in	   the	   foreground	   a	   social	  
construction	  that	  looks	  increasingly	  like	  gambling.	  
	  
Although	   due	   to	   the	   obvious	   collectivist	   undertones	   community	   currencies	   could	   be	   labelled	   as	  
‘socialist’	   in	   some	   sense,	   and	   are	   in	   fact	   being	   actively	   supported	   by	   e.g.	   Hugo	   Chavez	   [37],	   our	  
interest	   in	   this	   article	   is	   not	   to	   support	   a	   political	   point	   of	   view.	   Our	   purpose	   is	   to	   analyze	  
scientifically	   and	   as	   impartially	   as	   possible	  what	  went	  wrong	   in	   the	  banking	   crisis	   and	  how	   things	  
could	  be	  changed	   for	   the	  better.	  Community	  currencies	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  diametrically	   opposite	  
phenomenon	   to	   investment	   banking	   and	   financial	  markets,	   in	   every	   possible	   sense	   (scale,	  motive,	  
methods,	   degree	   of	   embeddedness	   of	   economic	   action	   in	   social	   structure	   [38],	   etc).	   Both	  
phenomena	  can	  be	  accommodated	  by	  the	  same	  theoretical	  –	  or	  meta-­‐theoretical	  –	  framework.	  	  This	  
will	   enable	   us	   to	   make	   constructive	   proposals	   for	   what	  might	   be	   changed	   in	   the	   current	   banking	  
system..	  The	  next	  section	  develops	  a	  meta-­‐theoretical	  framework.	  
FINDING	  THE	  APPROPRIATE	  LENS	  TO	  THEORETICALLY	  ASSESS	  THE	  
ISSUES	  OF	  THE	  BANKING	  CRISIS	  
	  
Developing	  a	  Meta-­Theoretical	  Framework	  [39]	  [40]	  
We	  begin	  with	  an	   intuitive	  definition	  of	   ‘social	   construction’.	  Social	   constructions	  are	  perceived	  as	  
‘real’	   but	   do	  not	   have	   an	   existence	   independent	   of	   society.	   Although	   there	   are	   interpretations	   of	  
social	  constructivism	  according	  to	  which	  everything	  is	  a	  social	  construction,	  such	  a	  view	  tends	  to	  be	  
popular	   in	  more	  academic	  discussions	  of	  postmodern	  ideas.	  Our	  perspective	   is	  more	  practical.	  The	  
concept	  of	  social	  construction	  is	  very	  useful	  to	  make	  tangible	  phenomena	  or	  constructs	  that,	  in	  spite	  
of	   their	   sometimes	  abstract	   character,	  make	  up	  our	   everyday	   life,	   such	  as	  money,	  citizenship,	  and	  
newspapers:	  “Money,	  citizenship	  and	  newspapers	  are	  transparent	  social	  constructions	  because	  they	  
obviously	  could	  not	  have	  existed	  without	  societies”	  [6].	  
	  
We	  can	  speak	  of	  social	  constructions	  as	  resulting	  from	  social	  processes	  mediated	  by	  language.	  Thus,	  
social	   constructions	   acquire	   meaning	   through	   a	   consensual	   social	   process.	   The	   fact	   that	   such	  
processes	  create	  meaning	  apparently	  ‘out	  of	  nothing’	  and	  give	  us	  a	  way	  to	  talk	  about	  concepts	  that	  
are	  otherwise	  difficult	  to	  define	  affords	  to	  social	  constructivism	  the	  status	  of	  an	  epistemology	  (‘study	  
of	  knowledge’,	  in	  Greek).	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Figure	   7	   can	   help	   position	   this	   discussion	   within	   a	   broader	   context	   of	   social	   theory.	   The	   figure,	  
inspired	  by	  Hollis	  [41],	  summarizes	  the	  main	  analytical	  traditions	  in	  social	  science	  over	  the	  past	  few	  
centuries	   in	  addressing	  questions	  of	   socio-­‐economic	   structure	  and	  human	  action.	  A	   few	   indicative	  
and	  by	  no	  means	  exhaustive	  names	  are	  added	  to	  make	  the	  table	  easier	  to	   interpret.	  The	   left-­‐hand	  
column	   is	   generally	   associated	  with	   the	   rationalistic,	   deterministic	   tradition,	   it	   is	   the	   older	   of	   the	  
two,	   and	   grew	   out	   of	   naturalistic	   philosophy.	   The	   right-­‐hand	   column	   is	  more	   recent,	   it	   reflects	   a	  
greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	   social	   world	   for	   defining	   our	   reality	   (ontology)	   and	   the	   construction	   of	  
knowledge	   (epistemology).	   Although	   interpreting	   the	   two	   columns	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   objective-­‐
subjective	   dichotomy	   can	  only	   be	   a	   gross	   oversimplification,	   the	   thinkers	   in	   the	   left-­‐hand	   column	  
could	   be	   loosely	   grouped	   as	   sharing	   a	   belief	   in	   some	   form	   of	   ‘objective’	   reality,	   whereas	   a	  more	  
‘subjective’	  perspective	  permeates	  the	  ideas	  found	  in	  the	  right	  column.	  The	  different	  widths	  of	  the	  
columns	   are	   meant	   to	   reflect	   the	  much	   greater	   constituency	   (and	   funding),	   within	   social	   science,	  





Figure	  7:	  Map	  of	  social	  science	  adapted	  from	  Hollis	  [41]	  
	  
	  
Thus,	   the	   various	   flavours	   of	   social	   constructivism	   fall	   broadly	   in	   the	  middle	   of	   a	   spectrum	  whose	  
extremes	  are	   identified	  with	   the	   radical	   subjectivism	  of	   individual	  phenomenology	  at	  one	  end	  and	  
the	   radical	   objectivism	   of	   physics	   at	   the	   other.	   Because	   of	   their	   intermediate	   position	   between	  
subjectivism	  and	  objectivism,	  social	  constructivist	  processes	  are	  sometimes	  called	  ‘inter-­‐subjective’	  
(e.g.	  Popper	  [42]).	  
	  
The	   table	   can	   also	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   different	   accounts	   of	   social	   systems	   and	   therefore	  
human	  action.	  The	  top	  row	  favours	  a	  view	  of	  society	  and	  the	  economy	  that	  biases	  the	  importance	  of	  
structures	  and	  systems	  over	  individuals,	  whereas	  the	  bottom	  row	  represents	  the	  opposite	  view.	  This	  
distinction	   correlates	   also	   to	   methodology,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   theories	   in	   the	   top	   row	   tend	   to	   be	  
deductive	  in	  deriving	  behaviour	  from	  general	  principles,	  whereas	  the	  bottom	  row	  is	  best	  associated	  
with	  the	  longstanding	  and	  currently	  overriding	  tradition	  of	  empiricism	  and	  positivism,	  where	  general	  
principles	   are	   derived	   from	   experience	   through	   an	   inductive	   process.	   The	   relatively	   new	   field	   of	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Complexity	  science	  is	  proposing	  new	  words	  for	  describing	  processes	  and	  phenomena	  that	  have	  long	  
been	   studied	   in	   the	   social	   sciences,	   such	   as	   ‘emergence’	   to	   describe	   the	   not-­‐so-­‐well-­‐understood	  
relationship	   between	   local	   interactions	   and	   global	   behaviour.	   Part	   of	   the	   excitement	   felt	   by	  
practitioners	  in	  this	  new	  field	  derives	  from	  the	  development	  of	  new	  conceptual,	  mathematical,	  and	  
computational	  tools	  for	  modelling	  processes	  that	  had	  until	  recently	  been	  considered	  too	  difficult	  for	  
the	  reductionist	  scientific	  approach	  –	  and	  had	  therefore	  been	  mainly	  studied	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  
Some	  insights	  of	  Complexity	  science	  are	  useful	  and	  illuminating,	  but	  a	  vigilant	  eye	  needs	  to	  be	  kept	  
on	   the	   assumed	   ontological	   and	   epistemological	   basis	   when	   engaging	   in	   this	   particular	   type	   of	  
interdisciplinary	   discussion	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   falling	   back	   into	   the	   trap	   of	   ‘monorail’	   rationalistic	  
thinking.	  
	  
The	   perspective	   taken	   in	   this	   writing	   sits	   towards	   the	   centre	   of	   both	   spectra,	   favoured	   towards	  
collectivism.	  One	  simple,	  yet	  concrete,	  business	  example	  to	  relate	  this	  position	  is	  that	  of	  workplace	  
attire.	  A	  fairly	  common	  institutional	  norm	  is	  to	  wear	  business	  professional	  attire,	  as	  enacted	  largely	  
by	  Generation	  X.	   	   In	  more	   recent	   years,	  Generation	   Y	  has	  slowly	  pushed	   the	  workplace	   towards	  a	  
business-­‐casual	   environment.	   Such	   an	   example	   is	   important	   since	   it	   highlights	   the	   power	   of	   both	  
subjectivism	  and	  collectivism.	   Clearly	   there	   is	  no	  written	  objective	   law	  about	  workplace	  attire,	   yet	  
this	  most	  likely	  seems	  the	  case	  in	  many	  formal	  organizations	  across	  the	  world.	  Similarly,	  one	  person	  
would	  probably	  be	  fired	  if	  they	  thought	  themselves	  above	  the	  dress	  code	  of	  their	  institution,	  but	  the	  
wants	   of	   groups	   are	   able	   to	   gradually	   seep	   through	   a	   society	   or	   social	   group	   and	   create	   change.	  
Acknowledging	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  subjectivism	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  businesses	  and	  the	  economy,	  along	  
with	   the	   increased	  pressure	   towards	   change	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  more	   collective	  wants	  of	   society,	   is	  




The	  Structuration	  of	  Financial	  Institutions	  [40]	  
In	   spite	   of	   the	   optimism	   of	   our	   ideas	   it	   is	   prudent	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   it	   is	   very	   difficult,	   if	   not	  
impossible,	  to	  make	  general	  statements	  about	  social	  theory	  or	  social	  systems.	  
	  
There	  are	  no	  universal	  laws	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  and	  there	  will	  not	  be	  any	  –	  not	  …	  because	  methods	  of	  
empirical	  testing	  and	  validation	  are	  somehow	  inadequate	  but	  because	  …	  the	  causal	  conditions	  involved	  
in	  generalisations	  about	  human	  social	  conduct	  are	  inherently	  unstable	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  very	  knowledge	  
(or	  beliefs)	  that	  actors	  have	  about	  the	  circumstances	  of	  their	  own	  action	  [43].	  
	  
Elsewhere,	  Giddens	  [44]	  elaborates:	  
	  
There	  are	  no	  patterns	  of	  universal	  causation	   in	  the	  social	  sciences	  –	  that	   is	  to	  say,	  conditions	  in	  which	  
circumstance	  X	  will,	  and	  must,	  always	  be	  followed	  by	  circumstance	  Y	  –	  because	  all	  causal	  connections	  in	  
human	  social	  life	  are	  mediated	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  by	  agents’	  knowledgeability	  and	  agents’	  reasons.	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  Giddens	   is	  arguing	  that	  because	  the	  “theories	  and	  findings	  of	  social	  science	  cannot	  
be	  kept	  wholly	  separate	  from	  the	  universe	  of	  meaning	  and	  action	  which	  they	  are	  about”	  [43],	  they	  
are	   inherently	   multiple	   and	   defined	   by	   context	   (space	   and	   geography),	   subjectivity	   and	   time	  
(history).	  A	  shorter	  way	   to	  say	  this	   is	  that,	  unlike	  physics,	   in	  social	  science	  the	  ‘object	  of	  study’	  has	  
opinions about	  what	   is	   being	   said	   about	   them.	   All	   social	   science	   is	   therefore	   defined	   by	   “mutual	  
interpretive	  interplay”	  between	  theory	  and	  action.	  
	  
With	   this	   disclaimer	   in	   mind,	   we	   believe	   that	   a	   theoretical	   perspective	   that	   is	   at	   once	   helpful	   in	  
analyzing	   the	   credit	   crisis	   and	   in	   proposing	   possible	   strategies	   to	   minimize	   the	   probability	   of	   its	  
recurrence	   needs	   to	   reconcile	   the	   subjectivist/objectivist	   and	   individualist/collectivist	   viewpoints.	  
One	  such	   theory	   is	  Structuration,	  by	  Anthony	  Giddens.	  To	  appreciate	   its	   import,	   it	   is	  useful	  first	   to	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clarify	   the	   concept	   of	   institution	   as	   clearly	   explained	   by	   Geoffrey	   Hodgson,	   an	   institutional	  
economist	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  Thorsten	  Veblen:	  
	  
Among	   the	   preliminary	   tasks	   of	   scientific	   analysis	   are	   taxonomy	   and	   classification,	   involving	   the	  
assignment	  of	  sameness	  and	  difference.	  Classification,	  by	  bringing	  together	  entities	   in	  discrete	  groups,	  
must	  refer	  to	  common	  qualities.	  For	  classification	  to	  be	  enduring,	  it	  must	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  common	  
qualities	  themselves	  must	  be	   invariant.	  …	  the	  relatively	   invariant	  unit	  is	  the	  social	   institution.	  We	  may	  
define	  institutions	  in	  broad	  terms.	  They	  refer	  to	  the	  commonly	  held	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  and	  habits	  of	  
thought,	  of	   a	   routinized	  and	  durable	  nature,	   that	  are	  associated	  with	  people	   interacting	   in	  groups	  or	  
larger	  collectives.	  Institutions	  enable	  ordered	  thought	  and	  action	  by	  imposing	  form	  and	  consistency	  on	  
the	   activities	   of	   human	   beings.	   …	   Institutions	   are	   seen	   as	   both	   outgrowths	   and	   reinforcers	   of	   the	  
routinized	  thought	  processes	  that	  are	  shared	  by	  a	  number	  of	  persons	  in	  a	  given	  society	  [45].	  
	  
Giddens	   opens	   his	   influential	   account	   by	   expounding	   “the	   divisions	   which	   have	   separated	  
functionalism	  (including	  systems	  theory)	  and	  structuralism	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  from	  hermeneutics	  and	  
the	  various	  forms	  of	  ‘interpretative	  sociology’	  on	  the	  other”	  [43].	  The	  appeal	  of	  structuration	  in	  this	  
discussion	   is	   that	   it	   provides	   a	   balance	  between	   the	   emergence	  of	   institutions	   through	   processes	  
that	   are	   reminiscent	   of	   ‘bottom-­‐up’	   social	   constructivism,	   and	   the	   effect	   these	   same	   institutions	  
have	  on	   socio-­‐economic	   action	   through	  processes	   that	   are	   reminiscent	   of	   ‘top-­‐down’	   and	  history-­‐
dependent	  structuralism.	  In	  other	  words,	  implicit	  in	  structuration	  is	  not	  only	  a	  useful	  integration	  of	  
objectivist	   and	   subjectivist	   understandings,	   but	   also	   a	   measure	   of	   reconciliation	   between	   the	  
individualist	   and	   the	   collectivist	   explanations	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   action,	   although	   it	   is	   not	  
emphasized	  as	  much	  by	  Giddens	  himself.	  
	  
In	   a	   nut-­‐shell,	   structuration	   is	   about	   the	   social	   constructivist	   processes	   through	   which	   individuals	  
and	  social	  systems	  construct	  institutions.	  As	  the	  institutions	  acquire	  better	  definition	  and	  structure,	  
they	  increasingly	  act	  as	  constraints	  on	  the	  behaviour	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  individuals,	  which	  is	  closer	  to	  
Marx’s	   structuralist	   understanding	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   systems.	   However,	   as	   language	   and	   social	  
constructivist	  processes	  continue	  unabated,	  social	  systems	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  renew	  themselves	  over	  
time.	   Thus	   structuration	   is	   about	   a	   dynamic	   and	   self-­‐renewing	  balance	  between	   all	   four	   ‘isms’	   by	  
which	   socio-­‐economic	   action	   is	   generally	   explained:	   subjectivism,	   objectivism,	   individualism	   and	  
collectivism.	  
	  
There	  is	  an	  additional	  concept	  which	  hovers	  between	  the	  individualistic	  and	  collectivist	  perspectives	  
and	   that	   is	   relevant	   to	   this	   discussion:	   responsibility.	   From	   a	   purely	   individualistic	   economic	  
perspective,	  such	  as	  e.g.	  game	  theory	  or	  neoliberal	   ideology	  (bottom	  left	  quadrant	   in	  Figure	  7),	  the	  
concept	   of	   responsibility	   is	   associated	   with	   the	   survival	   or	   otherwise	   of	   the	   individual	   agent.	  
Regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   individual	   agent	   could	   also	   be	   a	   company	   or	   institution,	   the	  main	  
point	  is	  that	  this	  is	  responsibility	  towards	  the	  self:	  the	  individual	  agent	  assumes	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  risk	  
and,	   if	   things	   go	   badly,	   it	   accepts	   responsibility	   for	   its	   ‘freedom	   of	   choice’	   and	   bears	   the	  
consequences	  of	  the	  ill	  luck	  or	  poor	  choices.	  
	  
Alternatively,	  another	  form	  of	  responsibility	  is	  responsibility	  towards	  others:	  the	  individual	  person	  or	  
institution	  is	  seen	  as	  selflessly	  committing	  to	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  group	  or	  society	  and	  accepting	  the	  
responsibility	   to	   sacrifice	   him/her/itself	   when	   things	   become	   difficult.	   The	   volunteer	   fire-­‐fighter	  
would	  fall	  in	  this	  category.	  Collective	  responsibility,	  however,	  can	  also	  work	  the	  other	  way,	  meaning	  
society	   assuming	   responsibility	   for	   the	   failing	   individual/institutional	   agent.	   This	   is	   the	   case	  of	   the	  
huge	   and	   controversial	   bail-­‐out	   packages	   the	   banks	   have	   received.	   Thus,	   the	   discussion	   to	   follow	  
attempts	  to	  balance	  these	  two	  rather	  different	  perspectives	  on	  socio-­‐economic	  action	  because	  they	  
both	  appear	  relevant	  to	  the	  life	  of	   individual	  and	  institutional	  socio-­‐economic	  actor-­‐agents:	  we	  talk	  
about	  ‘rational-­‐agent’	  incentives	  for	   individual	  banks,	  but	  also	  about	  ‘good	  behaviour’	  that	  benefits	  
the	   society	   of	   banks,	   and	   also	   about	   banks	   bearing	   the	   responsibility	   for	   their	   actions.	   This	   is	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consistent	   with	   our	   tendency	   to	   ‘claim	   the	   centre’	   of	   Hollis’s	   map,	   and	   is	   not	   incompatible	   with	  
Giddens’s	  structuration.	  
	  
So	  by	  ‘meta-­‐theory’	  we	  mean	  (1)	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  different	  theoretical	  perspectives	  shown	  in	  
Figure	  7,	  each	  of	  which	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  epistemology	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  and	  as	  a	  basis	  
for	  analysing	  socio-­‐economic	  action;	  and	   (2)	   the	  specific	   combination	  of	  perspectives	   that	  we	   feel	  
best	   illuminates	  the	  problems	  symptomized	  by	   the	  banking	  crisis:	   intersubjectivity	  and	  a	  mild	  form	  
of	  social	  constructivism	  as	  an	  epistemology,	  structuration	  for	  understanding	  socio-­‐economic	  action,	  
and	   the	   multi-­‐faced	   concept	   of	   responsibility	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   a	   governance	   perspective	   on	   the	  
banking	  system	  that	  attempts	  to	  balance	  individual	  freedom	  with	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  collective.	  
	  
With	   this	  meta-­‐theory	   in	  mind,	  we	   can	  begin	   to	  analyze	  what	  happened	   in	   the	  banking	   crisis.	   The	  
fact	   that	   so	  much	  wealth	   could	   be	   created	  or	   destroyed	   easily	   reinforces	   our	   perception	   that	   the	  
processes	  through	  which	  money	  and	  its	  derived	  assets	  acquire	  value	  are	  subjective	  and	  arbitrary.	  It	  
also	   indicates	   that	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   value	   creation	   of	   the	   financial	   economy	   can	   become	  
decoupled	   from	   the	  slow	  and	   ‘old-­‐fashioned’	  creation	  of	   value	   through	   labour.	   Further,	   the	  banks	  
betrayed	   the	   trust	  of	   the	  depositors.	  They	  did	  so	  because	   the	  system	   let	   them,	   but	  ultimately	   the	  
pull	  to	  make	  an	  ever-­‐larger	  profit	  from	  taking	  on	  ever-­‐more	  risk	  outweighed	  any	  qualms	  they	  might	  
have	  had	  about	  the	  depositors	  who	  had	  entrusted	  their	  savings	  to	  them.	  Of	  course,	  the	  existence	  of	  
deposit	   insurance	  in	  many	  countries	  mitigates	  the	  risk	  for	  cash	  deposits.	   In	  any	  case,	  however,	   the	  
system	  should	  enable	  the	  depositors	  to	  set	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  they	  wish	  their	  assets	  to	  be	  exposed	  to;	  
institutions	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  parlay	  more	  risk	  than	  the	  depositors	  originally	   intended	  through	  
securitization	  and/or	  repackaging	  of	  the	  assets	  into	  financial	  derivatives.	  
	  
In	  general,	  depositors	  base	  their	  choice	  of	   investment	  vehicle	  on	  a	  balance	  between	  perceived	  risk	  
and	   expected	   return.	   Securitization	   enables	   banks	   to	   repackage	   the	   investment	   vehicles	   originally	  
chosen	   and	   to	   expose	   the	   initial	   investments	   to	   higher	   levels	   of	   risk.	   This	   should	   not	   be	   allowed	  
because	  it	  overrides	  the	  choice	  of	  risk	  level	  the	  initial	  investors	  had	  made	  implicitly	  with	  their	  choice	  
of	  investment	  vehicle.	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  place	  an	  objective	  quantitative	  measure	  of	  risk	  
on	   an	   arbitrary	   security,	   a	   quantity	   that	   correlates	   with	   risk	   is	   rate	   of	   return.	   Thus,	   tranches	   and	  
packages	  of	  securities	  should	  be	  created	  in	  a	  way	  to	  reflect,	   if	  not	  match	  exactly,	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  
of	  the	  initial	  investment.	  To	  some	  extent	  this	  negates	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  securitization,	  so	  perhaps	  
the	   best	   approach	   would	   be	   to	   put	   some	   bounds	   on	   what	   can	   be	   securitized	   and	   how.	   This	   is	  
another	   facet	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   transparency	   that	   seems	   important	   for	   a	   more	   stable	   and	  
accountable	  banking	  system.	  
	  
The	  above	  indicates	  that,	  in	  the	  current	  banking	  system,	  at	   larger	  scales	  of	  financial	  activity	  money	  
can	   become	   alienated	   from	   some	   important	   dimensions	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   systems	   and	   social	  
dynamics	   [46].	   And	   yet,	   as	   long	   as	   all	   the	   players	   agree	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game,	   the	   creation	  or	  
destruction	  of	  huge	  sums	  is	  still	  felt	  as	  very	  real	  by	  everyone.	  This	  indicates	  that	  some	  kind	  of	  social	  
constructivist	   process	   applies.	   Therefore,	   our	   discussion	   serves	   to	   show	   how	   powerful	   social	  
constructivist	  processes	  can	  be	  in	  influencing,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  also	  in	  determining,	  our	  actions	  as	  
supposedly	  ‘free’	  and	  ‘rational’	  agents.	  
	  
In	   other	  words,	   the	   ‘free	  market’	   is	   actually	   a	   complex	  web	  of	   interconnected	   institutions	   and,	   as	  
such,	  is	  quite	  capable	  of	  supporting	  and	  mediating	  social	   interactions	  between	  its	  members.	  Where	  
these	  institutions	  become	  concerned	  with	  increasingly	  abstract	  financial	  instruments	  and	  with	  large-­‐
scale	   transactions	   that	  are	  divorced	   from	  the	  details	  of	   the	  underlying	  assets,	  we	   run	   the	   risk	  of	  a	  
social	   constructivist	   dynamic	   setting	   in	   to	   generate	   understandings	   that	  make	   sense	  only	  within	   a	  
restricted	   community	   of	   specialists,	   remaining	   opaque	   to	   everyone	   else	   [47].	   This	   is	   because	   the	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abstraction	   level	   contributes	   to	   decoupling	   the	   traders’	   perception	   of	   these	   assets	   from	   the	   real	  
economy.	  
	  
In	  this	  environment	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  acquires	  a	  similar	  status	  of	  abstract	  concept,	  unrelated	  to	  the	  
daily	  social	  interactions	  the	  traders	  themselves	  experience.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  familiar	  norms	  of	  
responsible	  and	  accountable	  behaviour	  are	  not	  as	  effective	  in	  acting	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  the	  drive	  
for	  profit	  maximization.	  This	   is	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	   local	  banks	  [48]	  whose	  directors,	  even	  today,	  
personally	   know	   many	   of	   the	   depositors	   and	   are	   embedded	   in	   the	   social	   structure	   of	   the	  
communities	   they	   serve:	   in	   other	   words,	   they	   feel	   accountable	   to	   them.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
banking	  crisis,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  this	  discussion	  it	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	  that	  the	  social	  constructivist	  
dynamics	   that	   emerged	   within	   the	   financial	   community	   legitimised	   behaviour	   which,	   to	   anyone	  
outside	  it,	  appears	  grotesquely	  irresponsible	  at	  best	  and	  criminal	  at	  worst.	  
	  
In	  this	  context,	  why	  the	  emergence	  of	  community	  currencies	  is	  important	  can	  be	  discussed	  further.	  
The	  banking	  system	   in	  most	   countries	   is	  based	  upon	   fiat	   [49]	  money.	   	  Fiat	  money	  has	  no	   intrinsic	  
value	   and	   the	   belief	   that	   fiat	   money	   has	   any	   value	   is	   a	   social	   construction.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  
money	  only	  has	  value	  since	  society	  has	  agreed	  to	  give	  it	  value.	  One	  may	  wonder	  what	  prevents	  such	  
social	   constructions	   from	   collapsing.	   The	   answer	   introduces	   two	   concepts,	   which	   subsequently	  
provide	   the	   necessary	   foundation	   for	   the	   social	   constructivist	   solution	   discussed	   below	   –	   the	  
concepts	  of	  trust	  and	  transparency.	  	  
THE	  APPLICABILITY	  OF	  TRUST	  ANAD	  TRANSPARENCY	  IN	  A	  BANKING	  
SOLUTION	  
	  
A	  Simplistic	  Model	  Showing	  the	  Relevance	  of	  Trust	  and	  Transparency	  to	  the	  Banking	  System	  
Having	  covered	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  having	  developed	  a	  meta-­‐theoretical	  framework	  through	  
which	  to	  address	  the	  problem,	  a	  model	  can	  now	  be	  used	  to	  show	  how	  these	  concepts	  can	  help	  us	  
develop	  a	  suggested	  solution.	  Since	  the	  model	  is	  only	  intended	  for	  demonstration	  purposes,	  it	  need	  
not	   be	   complicated.	   For	   example,	   let’s	   assume	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   very	   small	   local	   community	  
consisting	   of	   five	   houses,	   five	   banks,	   and	   five	   institutions.	   Now,	   assume	   that	   this	   model	   micro-­‐
economy	   utilizes	   a	   community	   currency,	   called	   Micro	   Tokens,	   and	   that	   there	   are	   500	   MT	   in	  
circulation.	   	  While	  the	  model	  undoubtedly	  requires	  simplifying	  assumptions	  to	  be	  made,	  principles	  
and	  lessons	  can	  still	  be	  learned	  and	  extrapolated.	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  challenges	  associated	  with	   the	  introduction	  of	  a	  community	  currency	  system	  in	  a	  given	  
community	  is	  that	  the	  smooth	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  depends	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  administrative	  
functions.	  For	  example,	  at	  least	  one	  person	  is	  needed	  to	  fulfil	  the	  role	  of	  bookkeeper.	  Such	  a	  person	  
is	  accountable	   to	   the	   community	   for	   the	  distribution	  of	   local	   currency	  across	   the	  participants,	   the	  
amounts	  exchanged	  to	  and	  from	  the	  national	  currency,	  the	  history	  of	  transactions,	  and	  so	  forth.	  All	  
this	   information	   is	  made	  publicly	  available	   to	  and	  verifiable	  by	   the	  community.	  This	   reinforces	   the	  
sense	  of	  shared	  ownership	  of	  this	  economic	  instrument,	  out	  of	  which	  we	  can	  plausibly	  expect	  that	  a	  
greater	  sense	  of	  shared	  and	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  greater	  mutual	  trust	  will	  grow.	  However,	  in	  
many	   community	   currency	   implementations	   this	   role	   is	   filled	   only	   on	   a	   volunteer	   basis.	   This	   is	  
problematic	  because	  in	  the	  long	  run	  the	  volunteers	  often	  get	  tired	  of	  serving	  their	  community	  [50].	  
Clearly	   this	   function	  needs	   to	  be	  made	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	   economic	  system	   it	   supports,	  e.g.	   it	  
could	  be	  remunerated	  with	  the	  local	  currency	  itself,	  as	  in	  the	  LETS	  and	  WIR	  approaches.	  
	  
When	   the	  community	  currency	  concepts	  are	  scaled	  up	   to	   include	  also	  an	   institutionalised	  banking	  
system,	  as	   in	   the	  WIR	  case,	   the	  role	  of	  bookkeeping	  is	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  banks.	  Thus,	  as	  shown	   in	  
Figure	  8,	   in	  our	  micro-­‐economy	  example	  the	  5	  banks	  have	  the	  responsibility	  of	  tracking	  the	  flow	  of	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Micro	  Tokens,	  and	  of	  making	   this	   information	  available	   to	  each	  other	  and	   to	  the	  public.	  As	  we	  will	  
argue	  below,	   this	   added	   responsibility	   is	   not	   just	   an	   additional	   service	   that	   the	  banks	   perform	   for	  
their	   customers,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   help	   their	   business	   activities.	   Banks	   can	  benefit	   from	   transparent	  
bookkeeping	  since	  it	  provides	   them	  with	  the	  knowledge	  of	  exactly	  where	  the	  Micro	  Tokens	  are.	   In	  
other	  words,	  our	  argument	  is	  that	  establishing	  greater	  transparency	  (by	  disclosing	  more	  information	  
on	   the	   size	   and	   risk	   rating	   of	   transactions,	   allowing	   for	   a	   more	   accurate	   estimate	   of	   risk)	   in	   the	  
banking	  system	  brings	  significant	  economic	  and	  business	  advantages.	  Since	  transparency	  is	  not	  the	  
predominant	   characteristic	   of	   current	   banking	   practice,	   however,	   we	   first	   explore	   the	   economic	  





Figure	  8:	  Transparency	  mitigates	  the	  dangers	  of	  an	  interconnected	  economy	  
	  
	  
Since	  all	  of	  the	  banks	  keep	  track	  of	  where	  all	  the	  Micro	  Tokens	  are	  distributed,	  this	  means	  that	  Bank	  
1	  knows	  how	  many	  Micro	  Tokens	  are	  being	  held	  across	  the	  five	  houses,	  across	  the	  five	   institutions,	  
and	  across	   the	   four	  other	  banks.	   Imagine	   that	   Bank	   2	  has	  50	  MT	  of	  assets.	   Also,	   Bank	  2	  has	  a	  bet	  
with	  Bank	  3	  for	  80	  MT	  on	  whether	  Institution	  1	  will	  collapse.	  Since	  Bank	  2’s	  assets	  are	  tied	  up	  with	  
the	   bet,	   Bank	   2	   seeks	   a	   loan	   from	   Bank	   1	   in	   order	   to	   service	   its	   other	   activities	   with	   its	   other	  
customers.	  Bank	  1	  believes	  that	  Institution	  1	  will	  collapse	  and,	  due	  to	  the	  transparency	  provided	  by	  
the	  Micro	  Token	  bookkeeping,	  Bank	  1	  knows	  that	  Bank	  2	  has	  an	  80	  MT	  bet	  that	  Institution	  1	  will	  not	  
collapse,	  yet	  only	  holds	  50	  MT	  of	  assets.	  Therefore,	  Bank	  1	  will	  not	  lend	  Bank	  2	  any	  Micro	  Tokens.	  As	  
a	   consequence,	   Bank	   2	   will	   not	   benefit	   from	   the	   transparency,	   and	   therefore	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   lobby	  
against	   any	   policy	   introducing	   transparency	   requirements.	   This	   bias	   against	   transparency	  
characterizes	  the	  banking	  sector	  today.	  
	  
What	   we	   witnessed	   through	   the	   example	   is	   that,	   from	   Bank	   2’s	   point	   of	   view,	   transparency	  
prevented	  Bank	  1	  from	  lending	  it	  any	  funds.	  This	  would	  have	  linked	  the	  fates	  of	  Bank	  1	  AND	  Bank	  2	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to	   the	   fate	  of	   Institution	   1.	  Had	  other	  banks,	   institutions,	  or	  houses	  been	  dependent	  upon	  Bank	  1	  
not	   defaulting	   on	   its	   loans,	   then	   they	   too	  would	  have	  been	   linked	   to	   the	   fate	   of	   Institution	   1.	   As	  
discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  this	   is	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  the	  spider’s	  web	  that	  links	  together	  the	  
agents	  in	  the	  banking	  system	  to	  suffer	  the	  same	  fate.	  Full	  transparency	  was	  not	  available	  during	  the	  
banking	  crisis,	  which	  is	  why	  banks	  like	  Bank	  1	  unknowingly	  linked	  their	  fate	  on	  bets	  that	  were	  many	  
degrees	   of	   separation	   away	   from	   them	   [51].	   In	   our	   example,	   by	   contrast,	   transparency	   is	   what	  
prevented	  Bank	  1	  from	  risking	  its	  own	  fate	  and	  the	  fate	  of	  all	  of	  the	  institutions	  dependent	  on	  it	  on	  a	  
very	  poorly	  placed	  bet.	  
	  
Thus,	   as	   summarized	   in	   Figure	   9	   for	   the	   micro-­‐economy	   example,	   the	   problem	   with	   lack	   of	  
transparency	   in	   the	   banking	   business	   is	   that	   it	   transforms	   a	   structural	   and	   unavoidable	   fact	   of	  





Figure	  9:	  Lack	  of	  transparency	  amplifies	  the	  dangers	  of	  an	  interconnected	  economy	  
	  
	  
Economic	  Interdependencies,	  Lack	  of	  Transparency,	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Market	  Intervention	  
The	   interdependencies	   between	   economic	   agents	   and	   institutions	   highlighted	   by	   the	   micro-­‐
economy	   example	   are	   a	   fact	   of	   life,	   an	   aspect	   that	   is	   not	   only	   unavoidable	   but	   desirable.	   This	  
concept	   has	   been	   effectively	   captured	   by	   the	   ‘business	   ecosystem’	  metaphor,	   first	   introduced	   by	  
Moore	   [52],	   since	   a	   biological	   ecosystem	   is	   characterized	   by	   such	   a	   complex	   distribution	   of	  
interdependencies	   between	   all	   of	   its	   members,	   at	   and	   between	   all	   length	   and	   time	   scales.	   The	  
metaphor	  of	  the	  business	  ecosystem,	  even	  if	  radically	  reductionist,	  is	  appealing	  to	  some	  because	  it	  
implies	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  self-­‐organization	  of	  the	  system,	  through	  endogenous	  forces	  and	  processes,	  
and	   hence	   it	   negates	   the	   need	   for	   a	   supervisory	   or	   regulatory	   entity	  whose	   job	   is	   to	   keep	   things	  
running	  smoothly.	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Of	  course	  this	  is	  not	  what	  we	  then	  see	  in	  real	  life;	  for	  example,	  even	  a	  simple	  system	  like	  community	  
currencies	  requires	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  on	  the	  part	  of	  an	  accountant	  to	  keep	  things	  running	  smoothly.	  But	  
this	   point	   highlights	   the	   fundamental	   epistemological	   problem	   subjectivist	   and	   objectivist	  
perspectives	   invariably	  collide	  with	  when	  attempting	   to	  communicate.	  The	  subjectivist	  perspective	  
cannot	   help	   noticing	   the	   ‘elbow	   grease’	   required	   to	   keep	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   system	   running,	  
whereas	   the	  objectivist	   perspective	   is	   happy	   enough,	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   the	  model,	   to	   abstract	   away	  
even	  the	  structural	  (human)	  components	  that	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  function	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Thus,	  
different	  epistemologies	  draw	  the	  boundary	  of	  ‘the	  system’	  at	  different	  locations.	  
	  
The	   objectivist	   interpretation	   of	   a	   business	   ecosystem	   is	   strongly	   evocative	   of	   familiar	   neoliberal	  
claims	   that	   “the	   market	   knows	   best”	   and	   that	   any	   problem	   can	   be	   solved	   by	   the	   market.	   Thus,	  
whether	   or	   not	   we	   agree	   with	   the	   neoliberal	   point	   of	   view,	   we	   should	   approach	   seductive	  
metaphors	   from	   biology	   with	   caution,	   a	   lesson	   that	   social	   science	   learned	   long	   ago	   from	   the	  
catastrophic	  effects	  of	  social	  Darwinism.	  
	  
Although	  we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  space	  in	  this	  article	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  highly	  contentious	  ‘free	  market’	  
discussion,	   we	   can	   point	   to	   our	   recent	   and	   on-­‐going	   research	   in	   the	   development	   of	   a	   theory	   of	  
Digital	  Ecosystems	   [53-­‐55],	   in	  which	  we	  have	  gradually	  pieced	   together	  a	   rationale	   that	   integrates	  
bottom-­‐up	  processes	  with	   structural	   principles	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   action.	   This	   can	  be	   considered	   a	  
‘synthesis’	   of	   what	   traditionally	   have	   been	   labelled	   as	   rightist/agent-­‐based/individualist	   and	  
leftist/structuralist/collectivist	   perspectives,	   respectively,	   on	   the	   explanation	   of	   socio-­‐economic	  
action.	  This	  integration	  has	  been	  made	  possible	  by	  adopting	  a	  social	  constructivist	  perspective	  in	  our	  
research,	   with	   a	   strong	   reflexive	   component,	   as	   we	   outlined	   above,	   and	   has	   been	   significantly	  
influenced	  by	  Giddens’s	  Structuration.	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  by	  building	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  theorizing	  and	  direct	  experience	  in	  the	  application	  
of	   the	   digital	   ecosystems	   approach	   to	   sustainable	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   and	   innovation	  
initiatives	  in	  different	  regional	  contexts	  in	  Europe,	  India,	  Africa	  and	  Latin	  America,	  we	  have	  arrived	  at	  
a	  perspective	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  environments	  that	  respects	  individual	  freedom,	  
that	  values	  the	  self-­‐organizing	  properties	  of	  the	  market,	  and	  that	  calls	  for	  the	  direct	  engagement	  of	  
the	  stakeholders	  through	  the	  assumption	  of	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  the	  adherence	  to	  principles	  
of	  accountability	  and	  transparency	  from	  a	  minimum	  base	  of	  trust.	  The	  trust	  literature	  indicates	  that	  
there	  are	  combinations	  of	  accountability	  and	  transparency	  other	   than	  maximum	  for	  both	  that	  give	  
rise	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  trust.	  
	  
This	   is	  a	   tall	  order,	   to	   say	   the	   least,	  especially	   the	   responsibility,	  accountability,	   transparency,	  and	  
trust.	  Where	  individuals	  do	  not	  want	  to	  or	  cannot	  take	  responsibility	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  they	  can	  
delegate	   to	   institutions.	   However,	   this	   brings	   additional	   difficulties	   since	   we	   cannot	   assume	   that	  
institutions	   are	   universally	   regarded	   as	   trustworthy.	   In	   any	   given	   socio-­‐economic	   system,	   we	   are	  
therefore	   left	  with	  perhaps	  the	  oversimplified	  view	  that	  it	  is	  unwise	  to	  ‘outsource’	  governance:	  the	  
stakeholders	   had	   better	   roll	   up	   their	   sleeves	   and	   start	   talking	   to	   each	   other.	   In	   other	   words,	   a	  
general	   theory	   of	   trust	   may	   not	   be	   achievable,	   but	   through	   good	   will	   and	   hard	   work	   the	   social	  
construction	  of	  trustworthy	  institutions	  might	  indeed	  be	  possible,	  reinforcing	  the	  structuration	  view	  
of	  socio-­‐economic	  action.	  
	  
Coming	   back	   to	   the	   micro-­‐economy	   example,	   it	   would	   be	   understandable	   if,	   in	   the	   interest	   of	  
preserving	   the	   health	   of	   the	   market	   as	   a	   whole,	   the	   far-­‐reaching	   ramifications	   of	   its	   internal	  
interdependencies	   were	   to	   trigger	   the	   application	   of	   a	   defensive	   normative	   response,	   whereby	  
transparency	  guidelines	  are	   introduced	  by	  a	   regulatory	  body,	   formalized,	  and	  ultimately	   enforced.	  
Such	   a	   top-­‐down	   interventionist	   approach,	   however,	   would	   be	   a	   heavy	   interference	   with	   the	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market.	  As	  such,	  it	  seems	  worthwhile	  to	   look	  for	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  direct	   intervention	  that	  
might	  achieve	  the	  same	  effect	  of	  greater	  transparency	  in	  banking.	  
	  
Acknowledging	  the	  Socio-­Economic	  Environment	  
The	   simple	   model	   discussed	   above	   identifies	   how	   full	   transparency	   could	   balance	   the	   potentially	  
dangerous	   effects	   of	   the	   intricate	   internal	   interlinking	   of	   the	   banking	   system	   that	   leaves	   it	   so	  
vulnerable	  to	  failure	   in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  This	  paper’s	  proposed	  solution	  is	  based	  on	  viewing	  increased	  
transparency	  as	  an	   instrument	   for	  generating	  more	  business,	   rather	   than	  an	  obstacle	   to	   the	  same	  
end.	  As	  we	   noted	   above,	   even	   at	   the	   level	   of	   a	   small	   neighbourhood	   implementing	   a	   community	  
currency	   system	   the	   role	   of	   the	   bank	   needs	   to	   be	   self-­‐sustaining	   and	   integrated	  within	   the	   same	  
economic	  system	  that	  the	  community	  currency	  formalizes.	  Of	  course,	  the	  WIR	  system	  demonstrates	  
that	  banks	  can	  also	  be	  non-­‐profit	  institutions.	  As	  another	  example,	  in	  Islamic	  banking	  the	  amount	  of	  
interest	  and	  the	  investment	  behaviour	  are	  significantly	  constrained.	   In	  other	  words,	  many	  solutions	  
are	  possible,	  including	  the	  current	  overriding	  model	  of	  banks	  being	  run	  as	  profit-­‐making	  businesses.	  
	  
However,	  we	  should	  also	  note	  that,	  as	  of	  now,	  the	  banking	  system	   is	  broken.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  
game	  rewards	   risk-­‐taking	  and	  self-­‐destructive	  behaviour	   that	   is	  not	   conducive	   to	  safeguarding	   the	  
interests	  of	  the	  company’s	  stakeholders	  [56]	  or	  the	  economy	  at	  large,	  let	  alone	  the	  depositors.	  Past	  
government	  regulation	  has	  proven	  ineffective	  at	  shifting	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  game,	  as	  demonstrated	  
by	  the	  crisis	  itself.	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  government	  regulation	  is	  highlighted	  by	  
the	   current	   lawsuit	   against	   Ernst	   &	   Young	   by	   investors	   of	   Lehman	   Brothers	   in	   which	   off-­‐balance	  
sheet	   items	   allowed	   Lehman	   Brothers	   to	   wrongfully	   represent	   its	   stability	   despite	   the	   post-­‐Enron	  
Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  regulation	  [57].	  Not	  until	  the	  stakeholders	  realize	  that	  they	  themselves	  must	  force	  a	  
restructuring	  of	  the	  game,	  will	   the	  banking	  system	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  a	  sustainable	  
symbiotic	   relationship	   with	   the	   overall	   economy.	   In	   this	   case,	   stakeholders	   include	   practically	   all	  
parties	   with	   interests	   dependent	   upon	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   banks.	   These	   stakeholders	   include	   the	  
government	   due	   to	   the	   emergency	   loans	   it	   had	   to	   issue,	   the	   banks’	   shareholders	   due	   to	   the	  
depreciation	  of	  investments,	  and	  even	  the	  individual	  bankers	  due	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  employment.	  Bailout	  
money	  in	  the	  recent	  crisis,	  funded	  by	  all	  taxpayers,	  now	  also	  makes	  every	  citizen	  a	  stakeholder	  with	  
an	   interest	   in	   the	   reformation	  of	   this	   self-­‐destructive	  game.	  While	   the	  subsets	  of	   stakeholders	  are	  
diverse,	  all	  parties	  have	  a	  joint	  interest	  in	  preventing	  another	  banking	  crisis.	  Therefore,	  we	  must	  rely	  
on	  the	  stakeholders	  to	  demand	  a	  new	  movement	  of	  increased	  transparency,	  with	  regulators	  gently	  
guiding	  them	  towards	  this	  goal.	  
	  
A	  Voluntary	  Effort	  to	  Provide	  Full	  Transparency	  
Why	   should	   the	   banks	   seek	   more	   transparency?	   All	   institutions	   and	   banks	   wish	   to	   minimize	  
counterparty	   risk	   (the	   risk	   that	  an	   institution	  with	  whom	  an	  open	  contract	   is	  held	  defaults).	   In	   the	  
long	   run	   and	   particularly	   through	   times	   of	   crisis,	   minimizing	   counterparty	   risk	   leads	   to	   increased	  
profit.	  To	  demonstrate	  this	  point	  through	  a	  simple	  example,	  let’s	  assume	  that	  Institution	  1	  perceives	  
that	  Bank	  1	  and	  Bank	  2	  have	  an	  equal	  chance	  of	  defaulting.	  Institution	  1	  decides	  to	  lend	  100	  MT	  to	  
Bank	  2,	  chosen	  indifferently	  over	  Bank	  1	  due	  to	  the	  chances	  of	  default	  being	  perceived	  as	  equal.	   If	  
both	  banks	  actually	  do	  have	  the	  same	  chance	  of	  defaulting,	  the	  decision	  between	  one	  or	  the	  other	  is	  
irrelevant.	  However,	  since	  the	  original	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  risk,	  the	  actual	  level	  
of	  risk	  can	  differ,	  resulting	  in	  significant	  implications.	  For	  simplicity,	  results	  will	  be	  analyzed	  over	  the	  
long-­‐run	  and	   therefore	  an	  expected	   return	  equation	  will	  be	  used.	  The	  expected	   return	  equation	   is	  
simply	  a	  weighted	  calculation	  which	  multiplies	  the	  probability	  of	  each	  outcome	  by	  the	  return	  of	  each	  
outcome.	  Let’s	  say	  Institution	  1’s	  perception	  of	  Bank	  2	  was	  wrong	  and	  there	  is	  actually	  a	  5%	  greater	  
chance	  that	  Bank	  2	  defaults	  than	  Bank	  1.	  The	  expected	  value	  of	  transacting	  with	  Bank	  2	  over	  Bank	  1	  
using	  actual	  levels	  of	  risk	  is	  as	  follows:	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Institution	  1’s	  expected	  return	  is	  5	  MT	  less	  because	  the	  actual	  risk	  of	  Bank	  2	  defaulting	  was	  greater	  
than	   the	   actual	   risk	   of	   Bank	   1	   defaulting.	   Again,	   while	   an	  objective	   consensus	   of	   risk	  may	  not	   be	  
possible,	   increased	   transparency	  will	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  accurate	  estimate	  of	  risk	   that	  would	   lead	  to	  
increased	   profitability	   over	   the	   long	   run	   as	   a	   result	   of	   better	   informed	   decisions	   being	   made.	  
Therefore,	   a	  more	   accurate	   identification	  of	   actual	   risk	   over	   a	   number	   of	   transactions	  will	   lead	   to	  
higher	  profits,	  which	  are	  clearly	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  both	  the	  institutions	  and	  the	  banks.	  Banks	  and	  
institutions	  will	   choose	   to	   transact	  with	   counterparties	   that	   have	   the	   least	   risk	   of	   defaulting	   since	  
this	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  stakeholders.	  
	  
While	  the	  concept	  is	  simple,	  most	  institutions	  and	  banks	  rely	  on	  an	  estimated	  guess	  of	  counterparty	  
risk	  based	  on	  perceptions.	  In	  the	  recent	  crisis,	  it	  was	  perceived	  that	  banks	  such	  as	  Lehman	  Brothers	  
and	  AIG	  stood	  practically	  no	  chance	  of	  defaulting.	  Having	  seen	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  position	  they	  were	  
in,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  perceptions	  can	  often	  become	  disconnected	  from	  reality.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  proposed	  
solution	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  banks	  have	  more	  to	  gain	  from	  voluntarily	  providing	  full	  transparency	  of	  
risk.	  A	  firm’s	  counterparties,	  contract	  sizes,	  reserves,	  and	  other	  measures	  should	  be	  disclosed	  to	  give	  





Figure	  10:	  Institutions	  will	  prefer	  contracting	  with	  banks	  engaging	  in	  increased	  transparency	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Many	   firms	  will	   be	   reluctant	   to	   provide	   such	   disclosure,	   but	   these	   are	   the	   same	   banks	   that	   have	  
hidden	  risks,	   jeopardizing	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  system.	  Stakeholders	   in	  firms	  with	   lower	   levels	  of	  risk	  
need	  to	  push	  management	  to	  provide	  increased	  transparency	  since	  it	  is	   in	  their	  best	   interest.	  Once	  
one	   prudent	   firm	   discloses	   its	   risk,	   institutions	   seeking	   to	   minimize	   counterparty	   risk	   will	   then	  
transact	  with	  that	  firm	  more	  than	  with	  others	  (Figure	  10).	   Increased	  transactions	  due	  to	   the	  lower	  
counterparty	  risk	  will	  directly	  lead	  to	  increased	  profits	  for	  that	  bank.	  
	  
The	  next	  relatively	  prudent	  firm	  will	  realize	  that	  it	   is	   losing	  contracts	  due	  to	  a	   lack	  of	  transparency.	  
Before	   long	   another	   firm	   will	   have	   disclosed	   its	   exposure	   and	   will	   benefit	   from	   the	   transactions.	  
Thus,	  banks	  taking	  on	  relatively	  moderate	  amounts	  of	  risk	  will	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  
the	   first	   bank	   and	   to	   provide	   transparency	   in	   order	   to	   compete	   with	   the	   transparent	   firms.	   The	  
hesitant	  players	  in	  the	  game	  will	  be	  the	  ones	  with	  the	  most	  to	  hide.	  Much	  like	  a	  society,	  the	  banking	  
system	  will	  then	  shun	  banks	  that	  make	  imprudent	  choices	  (Figure	  11).	  No	  longer	  will	  the	  structure	  of	  





Figure	  11:	  Banks	  refusing	  to	  provide	  transparency	  will	  be	  shunned	  by	  the	  system	  
	  
	  
Banks	  have	  hidden	  their	  disease	  with	  cloaks.	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  disease	  spread	  and	  threatened	  the	  
whole	  society	  of	  banks.	  Any	  bank	  that	  is	  not	  ill	  with	  hidden	  sickness,	  i.e.	  that	  has	  not	  placed	  high-­‐risk	  
bets	   on	  purpose	   and	   that	   is	   therefore	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   ‘healthy’,	   will	   wish	   to	   pull	   back	   its	   cloak,	  
leaving	   other	   ‘clean’	   firms	   to	   transact	   with	   it.	   Much	   like	   the	   lepers	   of	   old	   times,	   those	   who	   stay	  
cloaked	   will	   be	   eschewed	   from	   society.	   In	   this	   manner,	   through	   a	   probabilistic	   argument	   it	   will	  
become	  increasingly	  advantageous	  for	  the	  society	  of	  banks	  to	  cooperate	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  stability	  to	  
the	  whole	  system.	  
	  
A	  Regulatory	  Push	  in	  the	  Right	  Direction	  
While	  the	  scenario	  above	  should	  offset	  and	  eventually	  mitigate	  the	  exorbitant	  risks	  banks	  have	  been	  
taking,	  a	  small	  push	  from	  regulators	  to	  guide	  the	  stakeholders	  towards	  the	  proposed	  solution	  would	  
also	  help.	  Any	  democratic	   society	   relies	   on	  education	  of	   the	  public,	   yet	   the	  media	  have	  construed	  
the	  problem	  in	  a	  complex	  esoteric	  manner,	  not	  favourable	  to	  bringing	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  
	   24	  
to	   the	   public.	   The	   agencies	   that	   are	   responsible	   for	   preventing	   these	   crises	   should	   see	   a	   broad	  
campaign	  to	  educate	  the	  public	  about	  the	  basics	  of	   investment	  banking	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  play	  a	  
visible	   and	   constructive	   role.	   Although	   the	   disclosure	   will	   put	   them	   and	   many	   banks	   in	   an	  
uncomfortable	   position,	   relative	   to	   the	   recent	   crisis,	   it	   will	   also	   demonstrate	   a	  willingness	   on	   the	  
part	  of	   these	   institutional	  economic	  agents	   to	  assume	  their	   share	  of	   responsibility.	  This	   is	   the	   first	  
step	  needed	  to	  rebuild	  an	  environment	  based	  on	  trust	  without	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  witnessed,	  credit	  
cannot	  exist.	  
	  
In	   parallel,	   a	   suggestion	   for	   regulatory	   action	   would	   be	   a	   policy	   that	   recommends,	   without	  
mandating,	   the	   equivalent	  of	   the	   transparency	  discussed	  above.	  While	   the	   IMF	  has	   recommended	  
certain	  measures	  for	  transparency,	  they	  admit	  to	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  their	  recommendations.	  They	  
state	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  basic	  takeaways	  they	  must	  learn	  from	  the	  crisis	  is	  that,	  “flawed	  incentives	  
and	   interconnections	   in	   modern	   financial	   systems	   can	   have	   huge	   macroeconomic	   consequences”	  
and	  that	  future	  regulation	  must	  “raise	  transparency	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  location	  of	  risks	  to	  foster	  
market	   discipline.”	   Such	   a	   statement	   implies	   an	   admission	   that	   previous	   measures	   failed	   to	  
adequately	  address	  transparency	  issues	  [58].	  The	  strength	  of	  such	  a	  policy,	  as	  proposed	  here,	  would	  
lie	  in	   its	  ability	  to	  clarify	  ex	  ante,	  and	  enforce	  ex	  post,	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.	  All	  future	  decisions	  
in	   times	  of	  emergency	  will	  weigh	   the	   level	  of	   transparency	  a	   firm	  has	  chosen	   to	   follow.	   	  Then,	   for	  
example,	   the	   fraction	  of	   the	  bailout	  needed	   to	   keep	   the	  bank	  solvent	  could	  be	  made	   equal	   to	   the	  
fraction	   of	   that	   bank’s	   total	   transactions	   that	   it	   disclosed	   transparently.	   Alternatively,	   should	  
another	  crisis	  occur	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  would	  only	  potentially	  bail	  out	  firms	  that	  met	  
the	  standards	  recommended	  in	  the	  policy.	  All	  toxic	  asset	  repurchases	  or	  loaned	  funds	  could	  also	  be	  
based	  upon	   a	   scale	   in	   proportion	   to	   a	  measure	  of	   transparency.	   Conceptually,	   the	   IMF	  has	   linked	  
transparency	   and	   market	   discipline	   through	   regulation.	   One	   publication	   suggests	   that	   greater	  
transparency	  would	   allow	   for	   “supervisors	   and	  policymakers	   to	  make	  better-­‐informed	   judgments”	  
and	   for	   penalizing	   “errant	   institutions	   by	   requiring	   them	   to	   hold	   more	   capital”	   [59].	   However,	  
comprehensive	  plans	  for	  achieving	  this	  greater	  transparency	  are	  lacking.	   
	  
Such	  a	  policy	  would	  avoid	  the	  problem	  of	  direct	  market	  intervention,	  while	  also	  managing	  to	  convey	  
the	  message	  that	  firms	  who	  refuse	  to	  voluntarily	  promote	  a	  safer	  banking	  system	  will	  be	  left	  to	  deal	  
with	  the	  risks	  they	  have	  taken.	  Properly	  conveying	  this	  message	  would	  put	  greater	  pressure	  on	  the	  
stakeholders	  directly	  able	   to	   influence	  such	  changes	   (shareholders	  with	  voting	   rights,	   the	  board	  of	  
directors,	   employees,	   etc),	   since	   it	   will	   be	   against	   their	   own	   interests	   being	   left	   at	   risk.	   In	   other	  
words,	   such	  a	  policy	  would	  make	   the	  banks	  more	   explicitly	  and	   transparently	   responsible	   for	   their	  
actions.	  Finally,	  such	  a	  policy	  would	  serve	  to	  reduce	  much	  of	  the	  moral	  hazard	  involved	  when	  bailing	  
out	  firms,	  which	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  political	   liability	  for	  national	  governments	  during	  the	  recent	  
crisis.	   	   It	   is	  also	  worth	  noting	   that	   this	  proposal	   is	  not	   inconsistent	  with	  the	  growing	  trend	  for	  self-­‐	  
and	  co-­‐regulation.	  Ofcom,	  an	   independent	   regulator	   of	   the	  UK	  communications	   industry,	  provides	  
one	  such	  example	  of	  this	  movement.	  As	  Ofcom	  notes,	  “an	  approach	  fulfilling	  a	  broader	  public	  goal	  is	  
often	  based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  measures,	  with	  some	  elements	  of	  a	  solution	  defined	  by	  regulation	  
and	  implemented	  via	  statutory	  instruments,	  and	  others	  possibly	  relying	  on	  self-­‐regulation”	  [60].	  
	  
Along	   these	   lines,	   one	   can	   argue	   that	   the	   government’s	   power	   over	   large	  banks	   is	   limited,	   largely	  
due	   to	   how	   important	   the	   major	   banks	   are	   to	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   economy.	   A	   bailout	   in	   itself	   is	  
almost	  an	  admission	  by	  the	  government	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  bailed-­‐out	  bank	   is	  so	   important	  to	  
the	  economy	  that	  the	  government	  must	  give	  in	  and	  provide	  aid.	  Many	  argue	  that	  limiting	  the	  growth	  
of	   major	   banks	   is	   needed,	   consistently	   with	   the	   Glass-­‐Steagall	   Act,	   in	   order	   to	   balance	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   banks.	   Arthur	   Wilmarth,	   of	   George	   Washington	  
University,	   contends	   that	   until	   restrictions	   on	   growth	   are	   adequately	   defined	   and	   enforced,	   there	  
will	  never	  be	  true	  stability	  and	  the	  government	  may	  again	  be	  forced	  to	  provide	  banks	  with	  bailouts	  
[61].	  Unfortunately,	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  still	  leaves	  significant	  loopholes	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  banks	  and	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the	   Basel	   III	   proposals	   released	   thus	   far	   have	   mainly	   dealt	   with	   liquidity,	   leverage,	   and	   capital	  
standards	  rather	  than	  expansion	  restrictions	  [62]	  [63].	  The	  provisions	  under	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  and	  
proposed	  Basel	  III	  changes	  certainly	  seek	  to	  prevent	  the	  dangerous	  risks	  taken	  by	  banks,	  but	  it	  seems	  
that	   neither	   seeks	   to	   prevent	   what	   truly	   triggered	   the	   bailouts:	   banks	   grew	   to	   become	   such	   a	  
significant	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  they	  posed	  a	  systemic	  risk.	  
CONCLUSION	  
	  
The	   theoretical	   framework	   developed	   in	   this	   paper	   shows	   how	   the	   same	   social	   constructivist	  
dynamic	   can	   reinforce	   the	   destructive	   behaviour	   of	   the	   trading	   community	   but	   can	   also	   lead	   to	  
stronger	  democratic	  institutions	  as,	  for	  instance,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  community	  currencies.	  On	  this	  basis	  
we	   have	   proposed	   a	   simplified	   model	   of	   economic	   behaviour	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   same	   kind	   of	  
transparency	  and	  trust	  required	  for	  a	  community	  currency	  system	  to	  function.	  By	  implementing	  such	  
a	   solution,	   the	   resulting	   increased	   transparency	   in	   banking	   could	   help	   to	   prevent	   a	   future	   crisis	  
similar	  to	  the	  one	  recently	  experienced.	  Although	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  banking	  system	  game	  is	  broken,	  
and	  that	  self-­‐destructive	  and	  greedy	  behaviour	   is	  still	  –	  even	  after	  the	  crisis	  –	  being	  rewarded,	  the	  
strategy	   we	   advocate	   to	   arrive	   at	   such	   a	   scenario	   is	   not	   one	   of	   heavy-­‐handed	   regulatory	  
intervention.	  Rather,	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  solution	  lies	  in	  strengthening	  the	  democratic	  dimension	  of	  
the	  banking	  system	  from	  the	  bottom	  up,	  which	  involves	  also	  the	  structuration	  of	  institutions,	  and	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  ‘free	  market’.	  	  
	  
Regulatory	   agencies	   can	   also	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   this	   (1)	   by	   setting	   a	   recommended	   standard	  of	  
transparency	  and	  linking	  such	  standard	  to	  the	  level	  of	  financial	  support	  a	  bank	  can	  expect	  to	  receive	  
in	   case	   of	   a	   crisis	   and	   (2)	   by	   informing	   and	   educating	   the	   public	   about	   such	   an	   accountability	  
mechanism.	  The	   latter	  element	  of	  the	  policy	  will	   change	  the	  role	  of	  the	  voting	  public	  from	  passive	  
depositors	   to	   active	   stakeholders	   and	  will	   do	  much	   to	   re-­‐establish	   a	   base	  of	   trust	   in	   the	   financial	  
institutions	   by	   the	   economy	   and	   society	   at	   large.	   It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   expect	   that	   from	   such	  
strengthened	  democratic	  processes	  and	   institutions	  credit	  will	   flow	  more	   readily,	  with	  greater	  and	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